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A PROCESS FAILURE THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

MARK SEIDENFELD*

ABSTRACT
Despite all that has been written about the choice between
purposivist, intentionalist, and textualist approaches to statutory
interpretation, to date the literature has not provided a justification
for the common judicial practice of relying on intent-based inquiries
in some cases and disavowing those approaches for textualism in
others. This Article fills that void and, in doing so, lays out a new
“legislative process failure” theory of statutory interpretation that has
the potential to move the debate beyond a simple choice between
textual and intent-based interpretation. This Article argues that
Congress and the courts comprise different linguistic communities
when they interpret statutory texts. It proceeds to define legislative
process failure as occuring when the interpretive mechanisms of
those communities produce different understandings of statutory
meaning. The paramount question then becomes: What is the legal
system’s best response to such failure? Legislative supremacy requires
that the courts and Congress come to some accommodation to ensure
that courts will interpret statutes in accord with the legislature’s
understanding. That assumption, however, is satisfied as long as
Congress knows how courts will interpret statutes and can adjust its
process to ensure that statutes will be interpreted as it intends.
Legislative process failure theory therefore leads to the subsequent
question: Which branch should accommodate the other’s method of
* Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law and Dean of Research, The Florida
State University College of Law. Special thanks to Abbe Gluck, Tara Grove, Linda Jellum,
John Manning, Steve Johnson, Dave Markell, and Mark Spottswood for comments that
greatly improved this article, and generally to the faculty at the FSU College of Law for
helpful insights and suggestions.
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attaching meaning to statutes, and under what circumstances? This
Article concludes that, generally, legislatures cannot engage in
judicial-type inquiries into statutory meaning while drafting statutes
because the cost of engaging in such statutory analysis before
identification of the potential provisions that might exhibit process
failure is prohibitive. But, once the legislature becomes aware of a
process failure, the costs of engaging in judicial-type textual inquiry
become manageable, and the error costs of interpretation due to
strategic manipulation of legislative meaning greatly increase. Thus,
in the face of such awareness, a textual approach is better justified.
Having developed the legislative process failure of interpretation, this
Article considers several types of failures for which courts should
accommodate the legislative approach to attaching meaning to
statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
Although academics have identified two opposing schools of
statutory interpretation—textualism versus legislative intent1—the
prevalent judicial approach to statutory interpretation today is a
pragmatic combination of the two.2 Many judges start with statutory
text, and if they are comfortable with the meaning they find, they
stop there.3 In a good number of cases, however, they do not find the
1. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 116 (explaining
that modern textualism takes seriously “the signals that Congress sends through the level of
generality reflected in its choice of words”); Jonathan Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (contending that textualism’s success in convincing interpreters to take text seriously, along with the willingness of its current proponents to consider
legislative context, has made it “hard to tell what remains of the textualism-purposivism
debate”); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (arguing that textualists and intentionalists do not disagree as much on the goals of statutory interpretation
as they do on whether the search for intent should be rule-like or more open-ended).
2. Some judges, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas and Judge Easterbrook, self-identify
or have been identified by others as textualists. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 15-17 (2012); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (“We should look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they
would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.”); Robert A.
Katzmann, Madison Lectures, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 678 (2012) (“[A]mong Supreme
Court Justices, pure textualists can claim only Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas as
faithful supporters.”). Others, such as Justices Stevens and Breyer, have identified with or
been described as purposivists. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (“Legislative history helps a court
understand the context and purpose of a statute.”); William N. Eskridge Jr., The New
Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 550 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA &
GARNER, supra) (describing Breyer as “the Court’s best representative of a pragmatic or
purposivist approach”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory
Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1465, 1513 (2012) (naming Breyer, Stevens, and
Ginsburg as the Justices “most purposivist in their approach to interpreting statutes”). But
most judges do not fit comfortably into either school—for example, relying on text when they
find it clear enough, but consulting legislative history when they find the text insufficiently
certain to resolve the interpretive question. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 17 (2009) (“Few judges limit themselves to a single interpretive tool, and many do not even strongly privilege one approach.”).
3. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011) (“Those of us who make
use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate
ambiguous text. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history
to muddy clear statutory language.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119
(2001) (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text ... we need not assess the
legislative history.”); United States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 279 (3d Cir. 2010) (refusing
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text dispositive and consider other sources of legislative meaning—most notably legislative history—to discern how they believe
the legislature intended to resolve the precise question they face.4
Moreover, when the legislative history does not include evidence of
congressional intent on the precise issue, judges often resort to
indications of legislative purpose to determine how Congress would
have resolved the issue had legislators explicitly considered it.5 Judges, however, generally do not satisfactorily explain why they sometimes find text sufficient, yet other times believe they need to resort
to non-textual sources of meaning. At best, judges explain consideration of legislative history by claiming the statutory provision at
issue is particularly ambiguous, or the legislative history particularly reliable or persuasive, when they bother to explain such
consideration at all.6
to apply the rule of lenity when a statutory provision is clear).
4. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (stating that
the intent of Congress, which controls interpretive questions, “will be discoverable in the text
of the [statute], its legislative history, or ... the [statute’s] underlying purposes”); Hall v.
United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 223, 231 (2011) (“[A] court turns to ‘the traditional tools of statutory
construction, e.g., legislative history,’ if the intent and meaning of a statute are not clear from
its plain text.”).
5. See, e.g., United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In the event
that the text of a statute is not clear, a court interpreting the statute may consult the
legislative history to discern ‘the legislative purpose as revealed by the history of the statute.’”
(quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 627 (1993))).
6. See, e.g., James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur task is to
determine Congress’ intent, beginning with the plain language of the statute itself.... If,
however, the text is ambiguous, we inquire further to discern Congress’ intent looking to the
legislative history and underlying public policy of the statute.” (citations omitted)); Nat’l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 512 (4th Cir. 2011) (refusing to consult
legislative history to override an interpretation “strongly supported by more reliable
interpretive tools”); Grant Thornton, LLP v. Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 514 F.3d
1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting use of legislative history because the statute was “clear
enough”). Such explanations essentially are ad hoc; they do not provide a coherent theory for
when use of legislative history is appropriate. See Carlos E. González, Turning Unambiguous
Statutory Materials into Ambiguous Statutes: Ordering Principles, Avoidance, and
Transparent Justification in Cases of Interpretive Choice, 61 DUKE L.J. 583, 589 (2011)
(“Because the law of interpretation lacks a hierarchy for ordering its injunctive principles, it
is incapable of identifying a single legally superior interpretation among two or more rival
interpretations.”); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of
Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 777-83 (2008) (describing why judges with
an ideological preference for particular outcomes might choose textualism in some cases and
intentionalism in others).
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Legal scholarship on statutory interpretation recently has
attempted to provide a theoretical footing for various approaches to
statutory interpretation, most significantly the intent-based
approaches of purposivism and intentionalism and their counterpoint, textualism, from which pragmatic interpreters borrow.7 The
scholarship has not, to my knowledge, provided a sound theoretical
justification for using evidence of legislative intent in some instances and textualism in others. This Article fills that gap by
providing such a theoretical justification for this pragmatic approach to interpretation, as well as some guidance for how judges
might implement that approach. That justification first recognizes
differences in the way the courts and legislatures ascribe meaning
to statutes. When those different mechanisms lead to inconsistent
meanings, it then considers the cost of one branch accommodating
the mechanism used by the other branch to fix statutory meaning.
From this inquiry, it posits what I call a “legislative process failure”
approach to statutory interpretation, which justifies judicial use of
legislative history in a subset of cases in which legislative history
currently influences judicial construction of statutes.
This Article begins by reviewing the fundamental arguments
underlying the intent-based and textualist approaches to interpretation. It concludes, as a preliminary matter, that textualists are
correct in asserting that legislation need not be, and in many cases
will not be, coherent. Legislation reflects bargains by different factions of legislators who had different preferences about what the
statute should mean as applied to concrete situations. This Article
then argues that it does not follow from this incoherence that judges
7. See CROSS, supra note 2, at 10-23 (describing the goals of various approaches to
statutory interpretation); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 250-56 (1992) (describing judges’
invocation of justifications for various approaches to statutory interpretation as reigniting
interest in interpretation theory). Leading textualists claim that they do look for legislative
intent, but they say that intent is objective—based on the best public meaning of the words
of the statute at the time it was enacted. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 16-17 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997); Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 65; John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 79-80 (2006). Intentionalists and
purposivists, in contrast, accept that Congress’s subjective intent about the meaning of a
statute may be relevant.
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should always be textualists, but rather that judges should not deviate from the best reading of the text unless they have evidence of a
legislative process failure that makes it likely that the statutory
provision at issue does not reflect such a bargain. In the face of such
a failure, a judge can assert that a textualist determination of the
statute’s meaning did not reflect legislators’ knowing bargain, justifying some remedy for what amounts to a failure of the “legislative
market.”
This Article next fleshes out the notion of legislative process
failure. Just as those with a different level of trust in markets see
the prevalence of market failures differently,8 those with different
beliefs about the appropriate sphere for judicial participation in the
law-making process via interpretation will tend to disagree about
the prevalence of process failures and about precisely what constitutes such a failure. Nonetheless, this Article will demonstrate that
even textualists accept some interpretive doctrines that allow courts
to deviate from the best reading of statutory text in the face of
evidence of legislative process failure. Therefore, the meaningful
question is: Which institution should accommodate the other’s
mechanism of ascribing meaning when faced with a particular
legislative process imperfection?
Finally, this Article fleshes out the operation of legislative process
failure theory by discussing possible process imperfections that
courts should consider sufficient justification for deviating from textualist principles. Just as the effects of market imperfections might
be more acceptable than regulation to remedy those imperfections,9
different process imperfections might justify different judicial interpretive reactions, from virtually ignoring the text of the statute in
a particular case to interpreting the statute in light of the best reading of the text despite the process failure. Hence, this Article discusses how application of intent-based principles might remedy process defects, and evaluates when such applications are warranted.
8. See, e.g., Giesela Rühl, Book Review, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 841, 852 (2011) (reviewing
ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009)) (“O’Hara and Ribstein’s
ultimate trust in markets, along with their deeply rooted skepticism towards claims of market
failures, should be critically reviewed.”).
9. See Richard A. Epstein, The Regulation of Interchange Fees: Australian Fine-Tuning
Gone Awry, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 551, 591 (arguing that reforms meant to correct
admitted market imperfections may impose more costs than they eliminate).
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I. PREVAILING PARADIGMS FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Intent-Based Interpretation
There are two theoretically distinct approaches to intent-based
interpretation: purposivism and intentionalism.10 Traditionally,
purposivism seeks to predict the outcome that a reasonable Congress at the time of enactment would have reached had it explicitly
considered the precise issue raised in a case.11 “Purposivists give
precedence to policy context—evidence that goes to the way a
reasonable person conversant with the circumstances underlying
enactment [of a statute] would suppress the mischief [at which the
statute aims] and advance the remedy.”12 Essentially, judges look
for the purpose underlying the statutory provisions at issue in a
case, and then choose the interpretation of the provisions that best
furthers that goal.13
Purposivism allows significant leeway for judges to interpret
statutes.14 The purpose of a statute’s provision is not self-evident.15
This lack of clarity is further exacerbated by the possibility of
finding purposes at different levels of specificity. For example, at the
broadest level, a judge can plausibly argue that provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring incumbent local exchange companies (LECs) to lease unbundled network elements to
competitor LECs on a cost basis aimed to ensure a viable competitive market for local telephone service.16 But, given that the statute
10. See CROSS, supra note 2, at 59-60.
11. Manning, supra note 7, at 76 (“[O]ne can also plausibly cast purposivism as an
objective framework that aspires to reconstruct the policy that a hypothetical ‘reasonable
legislator’ would have adopted in the context of the legislation.”).
12. Id. at 91.
13. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1592 (2008) (“[P]urposivists take the view that ambiguities can be resolved by identifying the statute’s overarching purpose and then determining how the text can best be read to accomplish that goal.”).
14. Few courts today invoke what Jonathan Molot calls strong purposivism because that
approach to interpretation allowed judges significant leeway to substitute their preferences
for those enacted into statute. See Molot, supra note 1, at 30.
15. See id. at 20-21.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000); see Jerry Ellig, Costs and Consequences of Federal Telecommunications Regulations, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 37, 87 (2006) (characterizing the purpose
of unbundling as encouraging competition in local telephone service).
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required such leasing only for necessary network elements and only
to the extent that refusal to lease elements would impair the ability
of a competitor LEC to provide local telephone service, a judge could
also read the provisions as aimed only to provide affordable access
to those elements that would be inefficiently redundant if each LEC
had to provide them on its own.17 This flexibility to find purposes at
different levels of generality allows judges to reach very different
outcomes when faced with a particular dispute.18
Intentionalism usually focuses on evidence of actual legislative
intent with respect to the precise question facing the interpreting
court.19 Intentionalism counsels that judges should interpret a
statute to reach the outcome in any particular case that reflects the
intent of the legislative body that enacted the statute.20 That is, an
intentionalist judge does not seek to determine some overriding
purpose of the statutory provision and then, faced with a particular
factual context, choose the interpretation that would best further
that purpose. Rather, she asks: What was the understanding of the
legislature about how the statute would operate in the particular
factual context of this case?21 Although intentionalism recognizes
that not all members of the legislature share such an understanding, it assumes that courts can divine the intent of the body as a
whole as to how the statute should determine the outcome of
particular cases.22 Intentionalism, however, begins to look a bit like
17. See Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony’s Deregulatory Shootout,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1516 (1999) (characterizing this provision as meant “to prevent
incumbents from using their control of ‘bottleneck facilities ... to discriminate against
competitors’”).
18. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 440-41
(2005) (criticizing classical intentionalists for interfering with legislative bargains by
“adjust[ing] the level of generality at which [the] legislation speaks”).
19. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 221, 272 (2010) (“Intentionalism directs
the interpreter to ... ask how the enacting Congress would have decided the question—and
to construe the statute accordingly.”).
20. See CROSS, supra note 2, at 59.
21. Linda D. Jellum, The Art of Statutory Interpretation: Identifying the Interpretive
Theory of the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 59, 88 (2010); Hillel
Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1103, 1107-08.
22. But see CROSS, supra note 2, at 61 (raising some of the problems with judges trying
to reconstruct legislative intent about the meaning of a statute in a particular case).

476

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:467

purposivism when, instead of looking for actual legislative intent,
it engages in imaginative reconstruction—looking for the meaning
that the legislature most likely would have preferred had it
explicitly considered the particular interpretive question at issue.23
Thus, although the distinctions between purposivism and intentionalism matter, the most important point for this Article is their
common willingness to treat all evidence of the statute’s meaning as
relevant to the court’s interpretive exercise, including non-textual
evidence that derives from the legislative process.24 Statutory
language is usually the most important evidence, given that
language is what was voted on by the members of the legislature.
But language and the legislative process that generates it are both
imperfect in many respects, and these imperfections together may
result in the enactment of language that may not be the best
indicator of the intent of the body about the meaning of the
statute.25 For example, language by its nature often is ambiguous.
Hence, it may be possible to read it in more than one way, and only
one of these readings will reflect the legislature’s subjective understanding of the statute. To resolve meaning in such situations, the
intent-based school will look at evidence extrinsic to the language
of the statute, including evidence of the problem the language was
meant to address, norms about how our society operates that give
23. See Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1568 (noting the relationship of imaginative reconstruction to
purposivism, but characterizing purposivism as “cast ... at a higher level of generality or
abstraction”).
24. See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1909, 1939-40 (2005).
25. As the Supreme Court has explained during the heyday of purposive interpretation:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than
the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.
Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose
of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When
that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked
beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the
plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one
“plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole” this Court has
followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction
of the meaning of words as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can
be no “rule of law” which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
“superficial examination.”
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (footnotes omitted).
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an interpretation more or less plausibility, and, most significantly
for this article, legislative history.26
The problems created by semantic ambiguity are exacerbated by
a messy legislative process, which often generates complex texts
that members of the legislature do not try to understand by themselves. Instead members rely on their agents in the process—for
example, staff members of committees responsible for drafting and
sponsoring the legislation—to explain to them the meaning the
drafters believed they had incorporated when writing the statute.27
When an amendment is made from the floor of one of the chambers,
there may not be any committee report explaining the change in
language, but the debate “on the floor” might shed light on the
purpose or underlying intent of the body. In fact, in deciding how to
vote, legislators focus more on committee reports and other reliable
pieces of legislative history than they do on statutory text.28 Intentbased interpreters see legislative history as direct evidence of what
those who voted for the legislation had in mind. They are therefore
willing to consult that history to discern the understanding of the
legislature when enacting a statute.
B. Textualism
Textualists believe that the meaning of a statute must derive
from the text of the statute without resort to extra-statutory legislative explanations of what that text means.29 They believe that a
court should construe a statute in accordance with the most likely
public meaning of its language when the statute was enacted. For
26. See Krishnakumar, supra note 19, at 272.
27. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 120
(9th ed. 2014) (contending that members of Congress “defer to the committees’ decisions”);
Abbe K. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 972-73 (2013) (reporting the following remarks of one legislative staffer: “Members
don’t read text. Most committee staff don’t read text. Everyone else is working off [the sectionby-section] summaries [in the legislative history].... The very best members don’t even read
the text, they all just read summaries”).
28. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 968-69.
29. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1288
(2010) (“Textualism maintains that judges should seek statutory meaning in the semantic
import of the enacted text and, in so doing, should reject the longstanding practice of using
unenacted legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative intent or purpose.”).
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textualists, subjective legislative intent about how the statute
should operate or about the meaning of its words, as distinct from
the best public understanding of those words, is irrelevant.30
Textualists rely on the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I of the Constitution to justify this belief, noting
that what the Constitution prescribes is a vote on the language of
bills.31 Textualists, however, do not limit their consideration to the
four corners of enacted legislation; they do not deny the relevance
of context.32 They will consult contemporaneous dictionaries and
other indications of generally accepted meaning at the time the
statute was passed.33 They will even consider the particular mischief
at which a statute seems aimed as some indication of how the public
at the time would have resolved textual uncertainty.34 Textualists
distinguish these sources, however, from extratextual sources meant
to shed light on the legislature’s subjective understanding of the
text. Hence, textualists categorically reject use of legislative history
as a source of statutory meaning.35
There are several possible reasons textualists give for distinguishing legislative history from other contemporaneous sources of
meaning. First, legislative history represents statements by members of a non-representative subset of the entire legislative
chamber.36 In contrast to dictionaries and other extra-statutory
30. Manning, supra note 18, at 424 (“[T]extualists believe that the only meaningful
collective legislative intentions are those reflected in the public meaning of the final statutory
text.”); Nelson, supra note 1, at 354 (describing textualists’ denial that objective intent of a
multimember legislature is a meaningful concept).
31. Molot, supra note 1, at 26-27; see also, e.g., Scalia, supra note 7, at 24-25; John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 695 (1997).
32. See Manning, supra note 7, at 79 (stating that purpose may be “a relevant ingredient
of statutory context”); Molot, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that modern textualists do not merely
consider plain meaning, but context as well). In fact, context is central to their focus on the
meaning of language. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 64 (1994) (“[B]ecause words have no natural
meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must consult these contexts.”).
33. See Philip A. Rubin, Note, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in
Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167, 174-75 (2010) (remarking that
although dictionaries are sources of meaning external to statutory text, textualists do not
scrutinize the use of dictionaries as they do the use of legislative history).
34. Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 61 (the context from which words take their meaning
includes “the problems the authors were addressing”); Manning, supra note 7, at 78.
35. See Manning, supra note 18, at 421.
36. See Frickey, supra note 7, at 250-51.
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sources that textualists are willing to consult, that subset of
representatives has an interest in having its interpretation credited
by the courts.37 Second, judicial crediting of interpretations set out
in legislative history would allow the subset of legislators to secure
its preferred interpretation without going through the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.38 Regardless of
whether that subset has an incentive to attach meaning different
from that understood by most members of the legislative body,
textualists contend that allowing a subset to determine statutory
meaning delegates law-making power in contravention of established Supreme Court doctrine.39 Third, and independent of any
constitutional constraints, the subset of the legislature might be
able to insert its preferred meaning for a statute in legislative
history even when it could not secure that meaning through the
enactment process.40 Thus, crediting legislative history, or, more
problematically, broad purposes judges purport to derive from it,
circumvents legislative bargains struck to allow the statute to be
enacted.41
37. In a speech given at various law schools, Professor Phil Frickey reported that
“Scalia charged that legislative history is the product of legislators at their worst—promoting private interest deals, strategically posturing to mislead judges, or abdicating all
responsibility to their unelected staff, who create legislative history at the behest of interest
groups or to promote their own private agenda.” Id. at 254; see also Charles Tiefer, The
Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV 205, 208-09
(reporting that textualists characterized “committee reports as deceptive shilling for special
interests”).
38. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen ... are frail
substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President.”);
Katzmann, supra note 2, at 672-73.
39. See Manning, supra note 31, at 698-99.
40. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005) (“[J]udicial
reliance on legislative materials ... may give unrepresented committee members—or, worse
yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic
manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the
statutory text.”).
41. Manning, supra note 29, at 1311-13 (describing the recent move of textualists to object
that the use of broad statutory purpose effectively overrides legislative bargains that are
reflected in statutory text); Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1026
(2006) (“[N]ew textualists conclude that ‘the Court should hesitate to employ interpretive
rules that threaten to disturb clear legislative outcomes, lest such rules unmake unrecorded
compromises.’” (quoting John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2438 (2003)). But see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102
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Textualists further argue that the very notion of subjective intent
of a multimember body is not well defined.42 Statutes are bargains
among legislators that are reflected in statutory language as the
legislative process runs its course.43 What gets included in the
statute may reflect agenda control and logrolling.44 For this reason,
statutes need not prescribe a coherent set of rules that favor a
particular regulatory value to a specified extent.45 Thus, one provision of a bill on environmental protection may strongly favor
regulation of pollution, whereas another provision may make it
difficult for the EPA and private parties to enforce such regulations.46 In addition, the legislative process accepts that there will
be vetogates, or points in the legislative process when someone with
a potentially minority preference regarding a bill can kill it.47 Sometimes such vetoes can be circumvented only by “buying off” those
who can exercise vetoes with other provisions in the bill that may
have nothing to do with the vetogate’s objection to the original bill.48
For example, legislation may provide “pork” for an intransigent’s

COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2064 (2002) (noting that legislative history, unlike broad statutory
purpose, may reveal the limits of the legislative bargain).
42. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 68; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (“[T]he quest for the ‘genuine’
legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway.”).
43. Manning, supra note 18, at 431.
44. Whether such techniques improve legislative outcomes is subject to debate. See
Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1338-48 (2000) (discussing the
equality, efficiency, and inalienability concerns of legislative logrolling). But our legal system
accepts these techniques as part of the legitimate legislative process. See Vicki Been, “Exit”
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 487 n.76 (1991) (“[L]ogrolling in the legislative process ... is accepted
as legitimate under the political theory of interest-group pluralism that is reflected in much
of the Supreme Court’s post New-Deal jurisprudence.”).
45. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19
(2001).
46. See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation,
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 113-15 (describing how the structure of
monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws renders enforcement especially prone to
capture).
47. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444-46 (2008) (describing nine vetogates in the congressional legislative process).
48. Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887,
918-19 (2012) (describing how those with veto power who oppose legislation increase the costs
of enactment because they will stop the legislation unless they are “bought off ”).
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home district if that member’s vote is needed for passage of the
legislation. But that “pork” is, nonetheless, part of the statute.
Examples exist clearly demonstrating that textualists are correct
that language—and not the preference of the legislators, independent of language—dictates statutory meaning. For example,
legislative history and other sources on the intent of Congress
members who voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicate that
inclusion of prohibitions on sex discrimination in Title VII resulted
from a strategic move gone awry.49 Representative Smith of
Virginia, an avid opponent of the Civil Rights Act, added the
prohibition of sex discrimination to make the bill so unpalatable to
moderate members that Congress would vote down all of Title VII.50
A coalition of those like Smith, who opposed the bill, and liberal
progressives led by five congresswomen, who favored the prohibition
of sex discrimination inserted the prohibition in the bill.51 But, when
the vote on the final measure was taken, the moderates decided to
vote for the bill despite potential reservations about the prohibition
on sex discrimination, and Title VII was enacted.52 Thus, even
though the legislative history provides evidence that a majority of
legislators disfavored outlawing sex discrimination, the prohibition
against such discrimination was in the bill as passed and
appropriately became part of the law.

49. For a thorough description of the addition of the prohibition on sex disecrimination
as a strategic ploy to kill the entire bill, see CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-17, 121 (1985).
Some have questioned the veracity of this story about the introduction of the prohibition of
sex discrimination. See generally Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts,
Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409 (2009). Because I use this story merely to illustrate the problems
that can arise from equating law with the legislature’s subjective intent, its potential lack of
veracity does not affect the analysis.
50. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (reporting Rep. Smith’s amendment); id. at 2578
(statement of Rep. Celler) (remarking that the addition of the prohibition of sex
discrimination was a strategic ploy to kill the entire bill); id. at 2581-82 (statement of Rep.
Green) (remarking the same as Rep. Celler).
51. See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 49, at 117; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History
and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation,
76 VA. L. REV 1295, 1322 n.113 (1990).
52. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 49, at 121; Zeppos, supra note 51, at 1322 n.113.
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Some textualists especially object to the use of a broad statutory
purpose to resolve ambiguities in statutory language.53 Statements
of purpose indicate the general goal of the statute, but critics
correctly point out that statutes do not mandate pursuance of goals
at all costs. Statutory provisions, to quote Judge Easterbrook,
represent “a vector,” not a ray; it has a direction and a stopping
point.54 That is, purpose is not useful to determine the degree to
which a statute mandates pursuing the purpose versus competing
legislative goals, including underlying constraints such as cost.55
More importantly, interpreting statutes to further broad purposes
ignores the precise bargains worked out through the legislative
process of enacting statutory text.56
C. Response to the Textualist Critique
To a great extent, intent-based jurists have moderated their approaches to statutory interpretation in response to much of the
textualist criticism.57 Most academics have recognized a need to
cabin judicial discretion and focus on text to assure that the courts
are “faithful agents” of the legislature.58 Today, outside of the invocation of the narrow “absurdity” doctrine, most judges who consider
legislative intent do so only after finding statutory language to be
unclear.59 Moreover, it is difficult to defend legislators’ intent about
53. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 546-47 (1983)
(arguing that courts should not override specific legislative choices about how far to pursue
a statutory goal); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2010 (2009) (textualists emphasize that “the level of
generality at which a statute speaks itself represents an important element of legislative
choice”).
54. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 63.
55. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Statutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their
enactment may require adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue
the main goal.”); Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 546-47 (arguing that courts should not
override specific legislative choices about how far to pursue a statutory goal).
56. See Manning, supra note 7, at 92.
57. See Molot, supra note 1, at 30-32 (reporting on “Textualism’s Broad Appeal and
Impact”).
58. Id. at 31 (“[S]cholars ... generally accept that courts should be faithful to legislative
instructions and follow laws enacted through bicameralism and presentment.”).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition
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how they would like a statute to operate—shorn of the cloak of
textual meaning—as an appropriate method of interpretation.
Hence, the judicial trend today is moving away from seeking
evidence of such “naked” legislative intent and toward focusing on
the understanding that legislators likely shared about the meaning
of the text of the statute.60 Courts that rely on intent-based interpretation start with statutory language as the most likely signal of
purpose or intent.61 Thus, for example, the inclusion of sex discrimination in Title VII is easily handled by intent-based interpreters.
Despite the fact that a majority of legislators did not favor prohibiting sex discrimination, there is no question that they understood
that the inclusion of that term in the statute would ban such
discrimination and that such a ban comes within the purpose of that
provision.
Therefore, intent-based approaches, in any of their modern forms,
do not treat legislative history as if it can simply trump enacted
text. Rather, those who apply these approaches recognize that the
text is enacted; they merely look at legislative history as evidence
of what the enacting legislature thought the text meant. I believe
that this use of legislative history runs afoul of neither Article I
requirements for enacting legislation nor Chadha’s formalist antisubdelegation principle.62 No one claims that legislative history is
the law. When the language of a statute is applied, courts have to
use some approach to interpret that language. “[L]egislative history
is helpful in trying to understand the meaning of the words that do
make up the statute or the ‘law.’ ”63 By giving credence to legislative
required by the test is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (quoting Lamie v.
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004))).
60. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic
materials [such as legislative history] have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent
they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous
terms.”); see also Morley v. CIA, 719 F.3d 689, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“[W]e should not reflexively cling to FOIA decisions that were decided on the
basis of legislative history during an era when statutory text was less central to statutory
interpretation.”).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Desposito, 704 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In construing
a statute, we begin with the plain language, giving all undefined terms their ordinary
meaning.”); Metamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We assume
that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language expresses the legislature’s intent.”).
62. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
63. Breyer, supra note 2, at 863.
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history, those who rely on intent do not recognize subdelegation to
committees or individual members to make law, but rather attempt
simply to discern the meaning given the language by those who
voted for it.64 Courts that carefully use legislative history to clarify
the meaning of enacted text recognize that legislators often rely on
committees to draft and explain language ultimately voted on.65
They do not, however, automatically credit extra-statutory legislative statements about the meaning of text as informative, let alone
dispositive, about such meaning. Rather, they look to whether there
is a reason to trust that such statements truly reflect the meaning
ascribed to the text by the legislators who voted for the bill.66 As
long as it is the interpreting court that determines the extent to
which such history sheds light on the likely meaning understood by
those who enacted the statute, creating legislative history does not
compel courts to heed it. In that sense, creating legislative history
does not constitute legislating. Thus, the formalist critique of the
use of legislative history seems overstated.
Modern intent-based theorists also concede the textualist point
that legislation rarely leads to a coherent outcome that furthers
some purpose in a reasoned fashion. Thus, few judges today are
willing to rely on legislative purpose as providing statutory meaning
independent of the textual evidence of the bargain struck by the
enactment process.67 In essence, those who rely on statutory purpose
64. If one believes, as intent-based interpreters do, that the appropriate inquiry is the
understanding of text by those who voted for it, then use of legislative history is no more
problematic than sources of meaning extrinsic to statutory language that textualists accept.
Legislative history does not choose the meaning ascribed by a majority of legislators any more
than dictionaries choose the meaning the public will give to statutory text. See Katzmann,
supra note 2, at 675-76 (noting textualists’ willingness to rely on extrinsic sources to
determine meaning in context, but also noting that he has not found dictionaries particularly
helpful in most cases). Some textualists have essentially conceded that legislative history may
not be problematic if used as a source of public textual meaning instead of as determinative
of such meaning. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Legislative history
may be invaluable in revealing the setting of the enactment and the assumptions its authors
entertained about how their words would be understood.”); Manning, supra note 31, at 733-37.
65. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 575-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 500 F.3d 1327, 1331 n.5 (11th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 2003).
67. See Manning, supra note 29, at 1309-10 (asserting that textualism has provoked
courts to “respect the terms of an enacted text when its semantic meaning is clear, even if it
seems contrary to the statute’s apparent overall purpose”).
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do so as a means of limiting the possible particular understandings
that the legislature might have had about case-specific interpretive
questions.
As to the critique that legislative intent is not a meaningful
concept, the fact that intent can be defined in some cases is
sufficient to rebut the textualist assertions that it is conceptually
flawed and can never enlighten the meaning of a statute. Focusing
on what legislators thought the words of the statute meant greatly
restricts the universe of possible “intents,” increasing the likelihood
of shared understanding. In addition, the work of Condorcet allows
one to define legislative intent with respect to some, and perhaps
many, questions of statutory interpretation.68 Under Condorcet’s
criterion,69 legislative intent for an interpretation exists when that
interpretation wins in a pairwise comparison with all other
interpretations.70 One can derive from Condorcet’s criteria that if
the question of interpretation essentially reduces to drawing a line
along a single dimension on which each legislator is assumed to
have an ideal point, and her preference is assumed to decrease with
the distance from that point,71 then there will be a median voter
whose preference defines the intent of the body.72 And there are
68. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 107-46 (1994) (noting that cycling in the real
world is rare and describing limitations on empirical studies that might explain why this is
so); GERRY MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED 17, 86-92 (2003) (contending that, in practice,
cycling is rare).
69. See Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decision Making, and the Voting
Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971, 994 & n.68 (1989) (“[A] choice meets the [Condorcet criterion]
if no alternative defeats it by a simple majority.”).
70. As the problem of cycling outcomes—and more generally Arrow’s Theorem—shows,
there may be no outcome that satisfies the Condorcet criterion given the underlying
preferences of legislators. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
94-96 (2d ed. 1963); Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 622-23 (2013).
71. Such a distribution is known in the public choice literature as “single peaked” over a
unidimensional choice space. See Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 259, 261, 263 (1988). Unstable voting equilibria in a body of 100 or more
members, whose preferences will be mediated by party loyalty and ideology, will be extremely
rare. See Richard G. Niemi, Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality, 63 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 488, 493-94 (1969). Thus, even if thirty percent of the members of Congress do
not evaluate issues on the liberal to conservative scale, a Condorcet winning outcome is likely.
Cf. MACKIE, supra note 68, at 86.
72. Andrew Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83
N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1280-81 (2005) (describing the proof of this proposition by Duncan Black);
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many disputes in Congress in which legislators’ preferences align
along the dimension from liberal to conservative. This does not
mean that it will always be possible for courts to discern the intent
of the legislative body from legislative history, or that judges cannot
abuse legislative history while claiming to determine that intent. I
simply assert that, used carefully in appropriate situations,
legislative history can reveal information about legislators’ understanding of statutory language.
The greatest problem for intent-based theories, given that it is the
language on which legislators vote, is answering the question: Why
should courts look to legislative history as an indication of statutory
meaning rather than accepting a semantically determined best
meaning of the text as dispositive? The fact that a committee that
drafted the text or a congressperson who proposes an amendment
from the chamber floor had a particular meaning in mind, does not
guarantee that the body as a whole shared that meaning.73 Textualists are correct that statutes virtually never point single-mindedly
in one direction, but rather are bargains between legislators. Hence,
statutes often will not represent a coherent vision of achieving a
single goal, even to a specified extent. Legislative history may
provide evidence of intent, but given its manipulability, courts may
do better simply to determine the best-accepted meaning of text at
time of enactment. This Article answers the question by considering
the costs of courts crediting legislative history versus ignoring it
when reliable legislative history supports a meaning different from
that which would result from textualist interpretation. There are
situations in which particular legislative process failures make it
likely that most legislators, or at least the median legislator,
understood the meaning specified in legislative history rather than
an independent best reading of the statute. In such situations,
courts can be fairly certain that a judicious use of legislative history
provides a better reflection of the legislative bargain that the

see also Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 26-28
(1948).
73. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 136-37
& n.245 (2001) (reporting that a majority of Justices on the Rehnquist Court in 2001
questioned the reliability of legislative history as evidence of the intent of Congress as a
whole, and collecting opinions expressing such concerns).
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statute entails than does the best contemporaneous reading of the
statute that ignores legislative history.
II. A THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE
A. The Concept of Process Failure
Having reviewed the textualist and intent-based theories of
statutory interpretation, I now set out an alternative that focuses
on legislative process failure to determine when a court can justify
an intent-based rather than a textual approach to interpretation in
a particular case. By “legislative process failure,” I mean situations
in which the best reading of the words of the statute, using tools and
the mechanism on which textualists rely, is unlikely to derive the
understanding of the statute to which most legislators ascribed, or
for issues on which legislators were likely to have single-peaked
preferences, the understanding of the median legislator. In such a
situation, textualism is likely to lead to an inaccurate determination
of the legislature’s understanding of the statute.
Once a court determines whether a statute results from a
legislative process failure, it must decide how to remedy that
failure. To the extent the court looks at legislative history to help
determine the meaning of a statutory provision, the court should
first consider whether the pieces of legislative history it would
consult are likely reliable signals of the understanding ascribed to
the statute by those who voted for it. More generally, before a court
decides what techniques to use to determine statutory meaning, it
has to evaluate the probability that each technique will signal an
inaccurate reading of the original legislature’s understanding. The
existence of a legislative process failure with respect to a statutory
provision does not imply that legislative history or any other
extrinsic sources of statutory meaning might not be equally or more
greatly flawed than textualism in revealing the legislature’s
understanding of that provision.
Even after a judge decides that legislative history is likely to lead
to a reading of a statute more in line with the understanding of
most legislators than a textualist reading, she must further determine why the signal about statutory meaning in the legislative
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history was not included in the statute itself. If there is no explanation why the information was not included, one logical conclusion is
that the people responsible for creating the legislative history
believed that they could not get the language accepted by Congress,
which implies that it is not a reliable signal of the reading of the
majority or the median legislative voter.74 In such situations, the
difference between the meaning derived using legislative history
and that using a textualist approach would not reflect a true
legislative process failure. Rather, it would reflect the inappropriate
manufacture of legislative history to manipulate judicial outcomes
by misleading courts to believe that there was a process failure. But
sometimes legislative history’s clarification of statutory terms might
not be included in the text of a statute even when the legislative
process would have passed the bill including such clarification. For
instance, the sponsors of a bill might face a deadline, or decide that
it would be too inefficient to include clarifying language through the
entire legislative process rather than just inserting an explanation
in the legislative history even when they could get such clarifying
language enacted. In other cases, members of Congress may simply
not be aware that their understanding is different from the
understanding a texualist court would derive from the enacted
statutory language. In other words, there can be true cases of
process failure.
As with virtually every approach to statutory interpretation, the
legislative process failure approach depends on an interpreter’s
judgment.75 The interpreter has to determine whether there likely
74. See Manning, supra note 31, at 688 (“[T]o the degree that judges are perceived as
grasping at any fragment of legislative history for insights into congressional intent, to that
degree will legislators be encouraged to salt the legislative record with unilateral
interpretations of statutory provisions they were unable to persuade their colleagues to
accept.” (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring))); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to
Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 397-98 (1992)
(pointing out that manufacturing legislative history “increases the chances that the member’s
intentions will become law if they are controversial”).
75. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (1994) (noting that textualism gives leeway to judges to interpret
statutes to further their ideological preferences); Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental States
Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1609, 1645
(2000) (“[J]udgment about which legislators’ intentions count and how much they count
requires careful evaluation of the realities of the legislative process and of how that process
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was a legislative process failure and whether using legislative
history to address it creates potential error costs from remedying it
that exceed the expected costs of the failure. My analysis attempts
to explain how such failure can come about and gives examples of
what I believe to be instances of such failure. In doing so, I hope to
give direction to courts on when to rely on legislative history to
clarify or even countermand statutory meaning that derives from a
textualist interpretation.
B. The Aim of Statutory Interpretation
Like modern intentionalists,76 and most judges,77 the process
failure theory of statutory interpretation assumes that the appropriate role of the courts is to give statutory language the meaning that
the legislators who voted for it would have understood. I believe that
in most cases this assumption is consistent with the proper roles of
the legislature and the courts. The legislature’s function is to make
law—in essence to make the choices of policy that the law will
implement and express these choices using language enacted into
law. Were courts to ignore legislative understanding of the language
chosen, they would essentially undermine the policy choices the
legislature thought it was enacting into law.78 As Joseph Raz
reasoned, “It makes no sense to give any person or body law-making
power unless it is assumed that the law they make is the law they
intended to make.”79
works in relation to statutory interpretation.”).
76. See CROSS, supra note 2, at 59; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 14 (1994) (arguing that no theory of statutory interpretation “yields
determinate results”).
77. Scholars have identified only two Justices of the Supreme Court and a handful of
federal appeals court judges as textualists. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An
Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts Of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 54 (1998) (identifying Judges Easterbrook and Kozinski as among a handful of textualist
circuit court judges); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 130
& n.89 (noting that Justices Scalia and Thomas consider themselves textualists, and that one
might also count Justice Kennedy as a textualist).
78. “[G]iven the extreme subjectivity of the Court’s dictionary approach and the intrinsic
malleability of the language canons, ordinary meaning analysis reflects broad judicial
discretion more than a commitment to the principal-agency relationship.” James J. Brudney,
Faithful Agency Versus Ordinary Meaning Advocacy, 57 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 975, 976 (2013).
79. Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL
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Although most textualists appear to disavow this assumption,
Professor John Manning has a more nuanced view. He agrees that
legislative supremacy requires that the legislature have intent
about what a statute means, but for him, that intent is a construct.
Manning asserts that the requisite legislative intent is satisfied if
“legislators intend to enact a law that will be decoded according to
prevailing interpretive conventions.”80 Thus, he would credit context
as important to understanding the meaning of statutory text at the
time enacted to the extent that context would affect the public
understanding of the language at the time.81 The problem with
Manning’s concept of legislative intent, however, is that Congress
and the courts do not use the same convention for decoding statutory text.82 Unless textualists can persuasively argue that the
legislature should adopt the judicial textualist key for decoding
statutes, the fact that the judicial textualist key would likely lead
to statutory meaning different than the meaning most legislators
would attach undermines textualists’ claim that they adhere to
legislative supremacy. The difference, therefore, in legislative and
judicial conventions for assigning meaning to statutes raises the
question in any particular case: Which institution should accommodate the other’s decoding convention?83
Moreover, despite textualists’ disavowal of the relevance of subjective legislative intent, some of the assumptions they make about
language undermine the credibility of this disavowal.84 For example,
POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996); see infra notes 141-55 and accompanying
text (discussing conditions that would support legislative supremacy in enacting law).
80. Manning, supra note 18, at 432-33.
81. Id. at 424 (“[M]eaningful collective legislative intentions are those reflected in the
public meaning of the final statutory text.”).
82. Textualists apply the judicial convention to the text, whereas purposivists are willing
to try to decipher the likely meaning that legislative decoding imparts to the text. See supra
Parts I.A-B.
83. That is the question that the legislative process failure approach to interpretation
addresses. See infra Part II.D.
84. The examples below involve textualists using canons that attribute meaning different
from the most likely public understanding of the text at the time the statute was enacted.
Hence, Manning’s view of intent based on decoding using prevailing interpretive conventions
cannot justify textualists’ use of these canons. Manning himself has questioned the use of
several tools of textual interpretation because of the tension they create with his view of
legislative intent. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 426 (2010) [hereinafter Manning, Clear Statement Rules] (“‘[W]idely held
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when a statute uses a term that has been construed by common law
courts to have a meaning different from its natural meaning, and it
is clear that the drafters of the statute borrowed that term from its
legal context, textualists will credit the specialized meaning.85
Justice Scalia unabashedly claims that this evaluation method does
not seek the understanding of the legislators who voted for the
statute, but rather merely the objective meaning of the text.86 For
example, he states that if the members of Congress “said ‘up’ when
they meant ‘down’ and you could prove by the testimony of 100
bishops that that’s what they meant, I would still say, too bad.”87 In
that hypothetical, however, Congress would be claiming to understand language contrary to clear universal usage, which renders the
veracity of the claim suspect, testimony of bishops or not. And it
allows Scalia to argue that legislators did not do their job by failing
to look up the meaning of the term when they use it, “because that’s
the meaning the persons subject to the law will understand.”88 But,
when Scalia relies on the technical legal meaning of the term
social commitments’ are soft sand upon which to build a regime of clear statement rules.”);
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2419-21 (2003)
[hereinafter Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine] (“[F]ailure to apply the lessons of modern
intent skepticism to the absurdity doctrine calls into question the coherence of the textualists’
... objections to strong intentionalism.”). This objection does not apply to the numerous
linguistic canons that are explicitly used in the legislative drafting process or that reflect how
language is generally used, see infra note 110 and accompanying text, because these will not
lead to a difference between legislative understanding and likely textualist interpretation.
85. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1616 (2012). But in that context, it is the
textualist who is using an understanding contrary to ordinary meaning. Scalia does not
explain why, if legislators understand language based on a natural reading, others would
know of and understand the language to convey a technical meaning. See id. With respect to
a legal term of art that is not understood in its technical sense by legislators, the only people
who will understand the technical meaning will be judges who, in parsing the meaning, will
research the genesis of the term and how it got into the statute, and perhaps those lawyers
who, in their practice, have run into it. In essence, textualists who use technical meaning
irrespective of legislative understanding essentially assert that the meaning should be that
which is determined by the process used by textualist judges. Similar critiques can be made
of textualists’ use of complex inquiries into statutory structure, which can lead to meaning
contrary to that which most people casually reading a statute would ascribe to it.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1612-13. I take Scalia’s reference of proof by testimony of 100 bishops to mean
that one could prove with certainty that a majority of legislators ascribed the meaning “down”
to the term “up.”
88. Id. at 1616.
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“falsely made,”89 it is he who ascribes to the term an unnatural
meaning that would not be given to it by any reader unsteeped in
legal lore.90 Outside of legislators who may have learned the
technical meaning of the borrowed term during the legislative
process,91 the only individuals who will be aware of its technical
meaning will be judges who, in parsing the meaning of the term,
have researched its genesis and its introduction into the statute,
and perhaps those lawyers who in their practice happen to have run
across it. Thus, the only non-intentionalist justification for a judge
to give the term its technical meaning is judicial fiat that the rules
for decoding a borrowed term accept the meaning ascribed by a
specialized subcommunity that includes neither the speaker nor the
likely listener.
Similar problems inhere in textualists’ use of at least some
substantive canons of interpretation, such as clear statement rules.
By using such a canon, the judge is essentially replacing the best
objective reading of a statute with one that follows the text less

89. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 126 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying
on a technical common law meaning of “falsely made” to conclude that an official document
containing false information was not prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012)).
90. See Manning, supra note 7, at 83 (noting that “modern textualists may sometimes
have to travel [far] to decipher an obscure legal term of art”). Manning admits that textualists
ascribe the meaning that would be given by “a hypothetical reasonable legislator conversant
with the applicable social and linguistic conventions.” Id. But he does not explain why those
conventions are peculiar to judges, who are not only lawyers, but spend much time applying
legal methods of determining meaning to terms that are known to lawyers who specialize in
the field from which the term of art term derives. Cf. Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding
Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of
Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1145-46 (2011) (criticizing textualist use of specialized meaning
as inconsistent, manipulable, and theoretically unjustified).
91. If the legislators were aware of this meaning, it probably would have been because
their staff members participated in the drafting of the statute or read the reports or
statements of others who did. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 965-67. Thus, if the
reports mistakenly defined the term and the mistake was not corrected, legislators’
understanding would probably be the mistaken definition, not the accurate common law
definition.
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accurately, and in some cases, hardly at all.92 Scalia, addressing
clear statement rules, explains such use by contending that
some of the rules, perhaps, can be considered merely an exaggerated statement of what normal, no-thumb-on-the-scales interpretation would produce anyway. For example, since congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity is such an extraordinary act, one would normally expect it to be explicitly decreed
rather than offhandedly implied—so something like a ‘clear
statement’ rule is merely normal interpretation. And the same,
perhaps, with waiver of sovereign immunity.93

Essentially, Scalia’s explanation, translated into active voice by
noting that it is Congress that does the decreeing, boils down to an
assertion that Congress could not have meant what the statutory
text says because legislators would not have eliminated state
sovereign immunity so casually. This rephrasing of Scalia’s point,
however, makes manifest that it relies on attributing to Congress
some understanding of the text of the statute that differs from the
best reading a court would give it.94
Nor can Scalia persuasively fall back on textualism’s objective
construct of intent. Clear statement rules may be disfavored by
Congress given that they are unusual and are likely to trigger
92. Clear statement rules are bound to undermine legislative bargains when they are
applied to statutes that predate the Court’s announcement of the rule because those who
drafted the statutes in Congress could not have been aware of the rule. They also undermine
legislative bargains when the rule is sufficiently indeterminant in terms of how clear the
statute must be that drafters will not know how to meet it. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 75, at 85 (discussing the bait-and-switch effect of applying a clear statement rule in a
context that Congress could not predict); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 40 (reporting
that congressional staff members involved in drafting statutes “were mostly unaware of and
do not use ‘clear statement rules’”); Michael P. Lee, Note, How Clear Is “Clear”?: A Lenient
Interpretation of the Gregory v. Ashcroft Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 260
(1998) (“Congress may mistakenly neglect to include a state function that it would have
wanted to incorporate in the statute.”).
93. Scalia, supra note 7, at 29.
94. Another way to understand my argument is to realize that if the aim of the judge is
to discern only natural understanding of the statute, and not legislators’ understanding, then
Congress’s reticence to provide for such a result casually should be irrelevant to the
interpretative process. Note further that those textualists who follow clear statement canons
while disavowing reliance on Congress’s understanding “function as something other than
faithful agents of Congress.” Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency,
90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 124 (2010).
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significant political reaction. But they matter only when they
override the best semantic reading of text, which for textualists is
the touchstone of objective meaning. Objective intent can shore up
Scalia’s reasoning only if the ramifications of the best semantic
reading cause society in general to read the statute in a linguistically perverse manner. Ironically, these rules are often used to
protect state interests such as sovereign immunity even though
states are well represented in Congress and apt to point out text
that is likely to harm their sovereign interests.95 This, too, undermines Scalia’s reasoning that as an objective matter, the text has a
meaning other than that on its face.
Similarly, Scalia cannot save his position by his complaint that
intent-based theories lead to meaning that will not be known to
those subject to the law.96 I will admit that, in some cases, a statute
might proscribe (or prescribe) private conduct of those without
access to sophisticated legal guidance. In such instances, the proper
judicial inquiry may be how the statute will be understood by
“ordinary people” subject to it, rather than those who voted it into
law.97 Although legal process failure may not be an appropriate
theory for resolving such questions, neither is textualism.98
Textualists resort to all manner of technical criteria—such as
canons of construction, the structure of the entire statute, consideration of terms in surrounding sections of the statute, or even how
the statute fits with related statutes—many of which are unlikely
to be used by the legally unsophisticated targets of the statutory
provision in discerning its meaning. Moreover, textualists seek the
95. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 282-83 (2000) (noting how political parties create a
framework in which federal officials depend on efforts of state parties and officials for
electoral success); Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395, 397-98
& n.11 (2012) (arguing that state legislatures’ power over congressional districting provides
a significant “political safeguard [ ] of federalism”).
96. Scalia & Manning, supra note 85, at 1616.
97. This position underlies the theory of interpretation set out by Hillel Levin. See Levin,
supra note 21, at 1115, 1119-20 (describing the benefits of interpreting statutes according to
contemporary meaning); see also Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 950 (noting that any
interpretive theory that sees the courts as faithful agents of the legislature is different from
one that sees courts as faithful agents of the public).
98. See Levin, supra note 21, at 1118 (criticizing both intentionalism and textualism
because both expect “each member of the public [to] be deeply engaged in an inquiry into a
law’s original meaning”).
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best meaning of the statute at the time it was passed,99 which may
not be the most natural reading when a person subject to it is
considering what the statute requires years later. In such a situation, perhaps the best interpretation would be a straightforward
reading of the statutory provision in light of the problems it currently seems to address—divorced from how Congress may have
used the term in other statutes or other provisions removed from
that at issue.100 This differs from a reading requiring evaluation of
the understanding that would be given to the statute by an omniscient reader years ago.
C. The Relevance of Legislative History
In determining the meaning that most legislators likely gave to
statutory provisions, legislative history can be relevant because of
differences between how courts assign meaning to statutory language and how legislators draft legislation to effectuate their policy
choices.
The method by which courts interpreting statutes assign meaning
to statutory provisions can be characterized as Bayesian-like updating of the probability that a provision has a certain meaning.101
Essentially, a judge starts with some signal of the meaning of a
statute—most often the ordinary meaning of the text of the statute.
The judge will thereby fix on some rough subjective probability that
a particular meaning is the best reading of the statute. The judge,

99. According to Judge Easterbrook, “Laws are designed to bind, to perpetuate a solution
devised by the enacting legislature, and do not change unless the legislature affirmatively
enacts something new. This implies that the right interpretive community is the one
contemporaneous with the enacting Congress.” Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 69. In other
words, the textualism of today’s advocates is originalist as well as textual. See Levin, supra
note 21, at 1108.
100. Recent scholarship on how Congress enacts statutes raises serious questions
regarding whether the whole act or whole code canons—which assume particular terms are
used consistently throughout a statute or the entire United States Code—describe how
drafters understand the text they write. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 930-31.
101. By Bayesian updating, I mean to suggest merely that judges start with an estimate
that statutory text has a particular meaning, and then update that estimate as they consider
the various tools of statutory construction that they bring to bear on the question of the text’s
meaning. Cf. Shawn Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 83 (2012) (explaining
“the simple Bayesian sense that all new information can update people’s conditional
probabilistic assessments of the world”).
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however, will then consider various tools of interpretation, determining the extent to which these tools support or undercut the
initial best interpretation. Thus, consideration of whether a term
within a statute is a term of art may change the subjective probability the judge ascribes to the various potential meanings of the text.
Canons of interpretation, such as consideration of words surrounding the relevant provision in the statute might lead the judge
to further update her subjective sense of which reading is most
likely the best reading of the provision, or for an intentionalist,
which reading most likely comports with the understanding of
legislators who voted for the bill. I do not mean to suggest that
courts engage in a Bayesian updating of probabilities in any formal
sense.102 But to the extent opinions provide a window into how
judges interpret statutes, most judges do approach interpretation by
independently identifying and considering in a reasoned, serial
fashion the effect of various relevant pieces of information such as
canons and other tools of interpretation.103
The mechanism by which Congress “assigns” meaning to statutory language is not as reasoned as that used by the courts. For
starters, legislators usually do not read any of the text of a bill on
which they vote, let alone read through all the parts of the bill that
relate to a particular provision to discern its “best” meaning.104
During the drafting process, no one performs the detailed legal
analysis a court would undertake to determine the meaning of the
bill.105 Legislators, or at least those with an interest in the bill from
102. Bayes’ Theorem provides a formal relationship between an a priori probability that
a proposition is true, and an updated probability given new information that has a certain
probability of occurring if the proposition is true. See Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic
Foundation of Law and Economics, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 199, 200-01 (2011) (providing an
explanation and proof of Bayes’ Theorem).
103. Cf. Yair Listokin, Bayesian Contractual Interpretation, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 364-65,
369 (describing how a court interpreting a contract would use Bayesian updating).
104. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 972; see also id. at 969 (“If one were to
construct a theory of interpretation based on how members themselves engage in the process
of statutory creation, a text-based theory is the last theory one would construct.”). A possible
exception to Congress’s lack of involvement with text is when a particular legislator, at the
behest of some supporter or constituent, demands a specific phrase be included in the statute.
See id. (noting staffer reports that “members participate in drafting only at a high level of
generality and rarely at the granular level of text itself”); Katzmann, supra note 2, at 655.
105. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600 (2002) (“While staffers [of the Senate
Judiciary Committee] are well aware of the general principles of statutory interpretation and
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the outset, craft some bargain that the bill is to implement and instruct others to draft the bill to implement that bargain.106 For
significant legislation, drafting is a communal process in which
those who write legislation—legislative staff members, lobbyists,
representatives from agencies, and the White House—seek agreement on the details of the bill that will implement that bargain, and
draft language to incorporate that agreement.107 They then vet the
bill among themselves and the organizations that they represent to
try to ensure that the language does incorporate the agreed upon
bargain.108 Less significant pieces of legislation and amendments to
bills may be drafted on the floor of the chamber and the process is
even less careful about language than it is for bills that get communally vetted.109
As the language of the bill is developed, those with an interest in
it—essentially those who are part of the drafting process—report to
those on the staffs of various members of Congress, or on occasion
to the member of Congress herself, about how they see the bill operating, and ask various legislators with whom they have influence
either to support or oppose it, or perhaps to support amendments to
do have in mind generally how a court would interpret the language they are writing, in the
ordinary course of drafting they do not spend substantial time anticipating or attempting to
research the judicial application of particular interpretive law to the bill being drafted.”). Nor
did the staff at the Office of Legislative Counsel engage in judicial-like analysis of the text of
the statutes they drafted, despite their expertise on interpretive law. Id. at 603-04.
106. Supra note 104.
107. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 150-51 (1997) (discussing the need for “legislators, legislative
staff, representatives of the executive branch, lobbyists, and ... professional bill drafting
services” to be involved in drafting and vetting bills to get them enacted by Congress, and
providing an example to illustrate the same is true in the New York State Legislature);
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 591.
108. Under the most thorough drafting process, after a bill is initially drafted, language
might be vetted with lobbyists and full committee staff before sending it to the Office of
Legislative Counsel for final drafting. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 591. For a more
detailed description of how legislative staffers view the role of lobbyists (broadly construed
to mean anyone outside the legislature with an interest in a bill), see id. at 610-13.
109. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 107, at 96 (“Legislators may vote on amendments to a bill
solely on the basis of quick staff briefing.”); Katzmann, supra note 2, at 655; Nourse &
Schacter, supra note 105, at 592-93. For drafting in conference committee, time constraints
often prompt unvetted insertion of language. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 593.
Congressional staffers indicated that such last minute drafting raised fears of “provisions
being ‘slipped in,’ people losing track of whether one provision squared with another, or a
provision being added to satisfy the needs of a [particular] senator.” Id.
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it. Because textualists interpret statutes by looking at how language
is used generally, in the process of drafting and negotiating the
language of the bill, and vetting what has been drafted, participants
catch much, but not all, language that might give rise to a judicial
interpretation other than that which reflects the legislative
bargain.110
Legislative history fits into this process in several ways. Given
the nature of the legislative process, there is no single committee or
legislator’s office that applies the judicial method of interpretation
to determine what the language of the statute means.111 Instead, the
staff members involved in the process use legislative history,
especially committee and conference reports, to signal to legislators—who do not have the time or inclination to engage in a detailed
linguistic analysis of the bill—how the bill will operate if enacted
into law.112 Generally, however, legislators do not even read the
committee reports. Instead, legislative staffers read the reports and
sometimes other parts of the legislative history that address
questions about which their principals might care. They then use
the information in such reports to describe the relevant operation of
110. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 928 (noting that although congressional staff
members are not aware of many semantic canons by name, their consideration of the meaning
of statutory language is consistent with most such canons); Nourse & Schacter, supra note
105, at 603 (reporting that attorneys in the Office of Legislative Counsel felt that they had
internalized the canons of interpretation). Gluck and Bressman, however, suggest that some
judicial canons are not consistent with how drafting occurs. See generally Gluck & Bressman,
supra note 27 (reporting that staffers use some of the canons in the same way as courts, use
others in ways different from courts, and do not use others at all).
111. The closest thing to such an office would be each chamber’s Office of Legislative
Counsel. Although attorneys in Legislative Counsel may be more aware of, and may have
internalized, some of the tools of the judicial mechanism for assigning meaning, such as
canons of construction, they do not analyze most statutory provisions in the probabilistic
manner that a court would if the meaning of the provision were raised as an issue in a case.
See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 603-05 (Legislative Counsel attorneys report that
they “do not believe they have to do interpretive research in order to [assess how a court
might construe the language that they draft].”).
112. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 968 (“[M]embers are more likely to vote ...
based on a reading of the legislative history than on a reading of the statute itself.”);
Katzmann, supra note 2, at 653 (summarizing the need for members of Congress to rely on
statements of their colleagues and especially on committee reports to understand bills on
which they vote); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 607 (discussing how reports are
frequently negotiated among staff and, among other things, are used “to explain a bill and to
obtain support from other offices”). Another major role of legislative history is “to shape the
way that agencies interpret statutes.” Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 972; see also
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 607.
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the statute to their principals.113 In short, legislative history is often
used to communicate the details of the legislative bargain to those
who have neither the time nor inclination to work through the
technical language of the bill. As such, it signals to staffers or
members of Congress the meaning of provisions that would be
difficult to discern using a judicial probability updating approach.
That is not to deny that legislative history can be misleading or
even abused. Certainly, numerous cases exist describing how
legislators or their staff members inserted statements into the
Congressional Record to assert that a bill’s meaning was contrary
to the apparent meaning of its text in a situation in which it is
unlikely that anyone in the legislative process would know of the
statement, let alone take it seriously.114 Obviously, the upshot of
these cases is that some involved in the legislative process sometimes manipulate legislative history to advocate a meaning that
could not survive enactment.115 Courts should not ignore the
potential for such abuse. But that is not the only or even the
primary purpose of most legislative history. More often legislative
history is used to signal to staff members or legislators the meaning
of provisions that would be costly to discern by other means.
D. Reconciling Judicial and Legislative Methods of Determining
Statutory Meaning
If one adopts legislative supremacy with respect to defining the
meaning of statutes—or in other words, that the role of courts is to
113. See Katzmann, supra note 2, at 653.
114. See Stupak-Thrass v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1299 (6th Cir. 1996); Cont’l Can
Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers Union, 916 F.2d 1154, 1158-59 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a statement
contrary to the clear meaning of the bill’s text that Senator Durenberger inserted into the
record after the House and Senate had agreed on the relevant language); FEC v. Rose, 806
F.2d 1081, 1089-90 & n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev’d, In re Nat. Cong. Club, Nos. 84-5701, 845719, 1984 WL 148396 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1984) (noting that the House Committee Report
included a statement contrary to the language of the Act, accompanied by no analysis and
rejected by numerous statements by bill sponsors on the floor of both the House and the
Senate); see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing reasons why
legislative history may be an unreliable indicator of the understanding of a majority of
legislators who voted for a bill).
115. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 973 (reporting that some congressional staff
members volunteered that they used legislative history to “include ‘something we couldn’t get
in the statute’ in order ‘to make key stakeholders happy’”).

500

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:467

interpret statutes in accord with the legislative understanding of
how meaning is assigned to the enacted text—then it is imperative
that courts and legislatures agree on the meaning of statutes. For
only then will courts give statutes operational meaning that agrees
with what the legislature thought it was enacting.116 This does not
mean that courts must acquiesce in the legislative method of
determining such meaning. It may be more appropriate for the
legislature to modify how it attaches meaning to the words it enacts
to comport with judicial interpretative methodology. Were the
legislature to alter its “interpretive” methodology, then it would
understand statutes to mean what courts would determine that they
mean, at least to the extent that the judicial approach to interpretation results in a unique meaning.117 But, it is possible as well that
the judiciary is the appropriate institution to accommodate the
legislative method of determining meaning.
When interpreting statutes, courts presume that Congress
“legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory [interpretation].”118 Implicit in this presumption is the expectation that
Congress will draft statutes so that judicial interpretation will
implement legislators’ understanding of the language that is
116. There may be reasons in particular circumstances to allow inconsistency between
legislative and judicial understanding of language. Cf. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at
614-16 (suggesting that it may be impossible to eliminate inconsistencies in how statutes are
drafted and judicially interpreted because of the different institutional demands of
legislatures and courts). For example, at least according to some constitutional theorists,
there may be a reason for courts to interpret statutes with a thumb on the scale to make
interpretations that reach certain outcomes less likely. See Ernest Young, Constitutional
Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549,
1553 (2000) (“Resistance norms, in the form of normative clear statement rules, can enhance
the operation of [political safeguards that protect the structural values embodied in Article
III of the Constitution].”).
117. The problem of coordinating the understandings of the two branches is exacerbated
by the fact that two judges who agree on the valid sources of meaning, such as two textualists,
can still reach different conclusions about the meaning of a statutory provision. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1531 (1998)
(reviewing A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 7)
(explaining how a willful judge can “shop dictionaries, canons of statutory construction, or
statutory precedents” to support a preferred outcome without relying on legislative history);
Michael P. Healy, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation in England and the United
States: An Assessment of the Impact of Pepper v. Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 231, 242-43 (1999)
(describing interpretations by two English textualist judges that reached opposite
conclusions).
118. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1992).
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enacted.119 But if Congress uses legislative history to communicate
to its members its shared understanding of the meaning of statutory
language,120 the textualist refusal to credit legislative history
imposes on Congress the burden of evaluating statutory language
as textualists do. In short, the textualist search for the best public
meaning assumes that this is the one true way to determine
statutory meaning regardless of institutional constraints.121 If the
problem is, as I contend, created by the existence of two different
communities that use different techniques for ascribing meaning to
statutory language, then the assumptions that the textualist mechanism for interpretation is correct, and that legislative reliance on
legislative history is incorrect, cannot be maintained. Because
language depends on shared conventions of meaning, neither of the
approaches of these two communities can be deemed right or wrong.
The meaningful question is when, if ever, it is best to force one
community to accommodate the other’s understanding of text, and
if so, which community should have to make that accommodation.
The issue is similar to that raised by the following story, derived
from an old joke that pokes fun at Americans visiting Paris without
learning French. An American in Paris is seeking directions to the
train station, and asks, “Où est la guerre?”122 instead of “Où est la
gare?”123 The textualist response would be “The war is over,”
perhaps with a barb that the American should learn French before
traveling to France. The intentionalist response would be to follow
up with the question, “Why do you ask?” Most likely the two would
then realize that the American is looking for the train station, not
the war. The question is which is the more reasonable—or cost
minimizing—response.

119. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 645 (1995) (“As constructed by Scalia, the
choice to legislate with clarity and precision belongs to Congress.”).
120. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
121. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule
of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI 265, 273 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (arguing that
if legislative history is a shared means within the legal community for determining statutory
meaning, then courts may appropriately consider it).
122. Where is the war?, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com (search “Où est
la guerre?” from French to English).
123. Where is the station?, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com (search “Où est
la gare?” from French to English).
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Textualists claim that there would be advantages to consistent
use of their “rules” for interpretation. They claim that such rules
constrain judicial discretion in reading statutes, and thereby reduce
judges’ ability to read statutes to further their personal policy
preferences.124 This, in turn, increases consistency of interpretation,
which would coordinate statutory interpretation by various federal
courts, reducing the likelihood of differing judicial interpretations
of the same statutory provisions.125 Further, it would align legislative meaning with judicial meaning, decreasing the likelihood that
courts will interpret statutes inconsistently with the understanding
of most legislators. But it is not at all clear that a set of rules
accommodating the legislative approach to finding meaning, which
in large part would describe when and how to use legislative
history,126 would constrain courts any less than would imposition of
the textual interpretive process.127 And if such a set of rules constrains courts equally well as the textual approach to interpretation,
it would also coordinate interpretation both within the judicial
system and between the legislative and judicial branches equally
well as the textual approach. Even if the textualist approach
provides a more consistent means of deriving statutory meaning,
and therefore decreases judicial interpretive discretion, if the
legislature cannot or will not comply with that approach, those
coordination benefits come at the expense of undermining legislative
supremacy about the policy choices that are incorporated into the
United States Code. That would still leave on the table the question

124. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 61-62, 64-65; see also Molot, supra note 1, at
16, 23-24.
125. See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a Defense, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 201 (2007) (noting that textualism purportedly limits judicial
discretion, “leading to consistent, predictable interpretations of law”).
126. See Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative
History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 90-134 (2012) (laying out some “simple principles for
reading legislative history”).
127. See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A
Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 207-08 (1999) (questioning whether
textualism has increased predictability and certainty of statutory interpretation); Robert G.
Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of Legislative History on Judicial DecisionMaking and Legislation, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2, 40-41 (1996) (concluding after
analysis of several British cases that relying on legislative history to help identify statutory
purpose can constrain judicial discretion).
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of whether the benefits of interbranch interpretive coordination
outweigh the institutional costs imposed on Congress.
I believe that this point is damning for the textualists’ belief that
their approach is the better one in all cases because there are strong
reasons to suspect that Congress will never adhere to the judicial
process for determining meaning. That process would impose
procedures on statutory enactment beyond those required by the
Constitution and thereby greatly interfere with the legislature’s
law-making function. In determining statutory meaning in a
particular case, a court focuses the power of some of the brightest
legal thinkers for significant amounts of time to determine the best
reading of a statute. Moreover, the interpreting court does so only
in response to a legal complaint. That complaint essentially signals
that the legislative and judicial interpretive approaches might lead
to different meanings for a particular statutory provision. But
without this signal from those subject to the statute after it has had
a time to operate, the legislature would have to perform such an
analysis with respect to any term of the statute that potentially
might lead to a difference between legislative and judicial understandings.128 Essentially, because Congress must attach meaning at
the time it enacts a statute, it cannot take advantage of the experience from application of the statute to signal potential process
failures. Moreover, textualists like to remind interpreters that individual legislators may have an incentive to engage in strategic
behavior to get their preferred interpretation into the statute.129 But
this further complicates the legislative task of determining meaning
because it implies that each legislator could only trust a member of
his own staff to perform the interpretive analysis. Otherwise, the
legislator would risk missing meaning hidden in the structure of the
statute, just as the textualists claim the legislator might be
unaware of definitions inserted into legislative history.130 Thus
128. Staff members from the Office of Legislative Counsel, which has drafting expertise
and is supposed to ensure that statutes implement the deals struck by the legislators, report
that they do not have the time to perform “top-to-bottom review complete with comprehensive
analysis of every bill the office helps to draft.” Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 604.
129. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1420-21 (2003).
130. My point here is simply that, if each legislator does not engage in the costly task of
analyzing the potential meaning of every statutory phrase being enacted, a colleague could
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textualists call on the legislature to apply an interpretive process
that would require an army of lawyers on the staff of each member
of Congress, and would increase costs of enacting statutes to such
an extent as to threaten the very ability of the legislature to fulfill
its role of making laws that it determines—via constitutionally
prescribed processes—are appropriate.131
The contention that legislatures generally can cure misinterpretations by courts132 would also impose huge unnecessary costs on the
legislature because enacting statutes is time consuming, resource
intensive, and is unlikely to occur even if the court imposes an
interpretation with which a majority of legislators disagree.133 Legislators have only limited time that they devote to passing statutes
even when they are reacting to misinterpretations of the meaning
that they ascribed to language they originally adopted.134 The very
lack of coherence of the legislative process contributes to the
likelihood that Congress will not override such misinterpretations.
To override an interpretation, the majority will have to overcome
strategically mislead him about the meaning of the statute, without resorting to legislative
history to implement the deception. Textualist concern about undue influence of legislative
outliers may occur via statutory text as well as legislative history. See Zeppos, supra note 51,
at 1323 (“The textualist ... draws a false dichotomy in setting the clear text that cannot be
read in different ways against a legislative history that can be manipulated to reach desirable
results.”).
131. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 619-20 (“[T]he sheer diversity of approaches
to the drafting process, the multiplicity of drafters, and the different points in time at which
text is drafted suggest the limited disciplinary effect of judicial rulings.”).
132. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 58
(2d ed. 2013) (“[T]extualists often respond to accusations that their interpretations lead to
unwise or unjust results by insisting that ‘if Congress doesn’t like it, Congress can fix it.’”);
see also John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1020 (2002) (“Congress is ...
implicitly invited to overrule or modify the courts’ decisions if Congress decides that they are
wrong.”); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach,
76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 121 (2001) (“[I]f Congress believes that the courts have made a serious
error in interpreting a federal statute, Congress can amend it.”).
133. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 132, at 974 n.25 (“Congress is often too busy
worrying about new laws to spend its time supervising and revising judicial
(mis)interpretations of the old ones.”); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the
Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1409-10 (2005) (“Congress is simply not equipped to react in
the normal course to most statutory interpretation decisions and ... [its] track record suggests
that its attention to statutory decisions is highly inconsistent.”).
134. See Schacter, supra note 119, at 605 (arguing that Congress is apt to leave in place
resolutions of issues by the courts with which most legislators disagree rather than risk the
political costs and spend the time to reverse them).
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legislative vetogates.135 One might argue that if a textualist court’s
interpretation is incorrect, Congress should easily be able to
reinstate the intended meaning. By recognizing the legislative
bargaining process, textualist misinterpretation will tend to err in
the direction of overly crediting special interests and vetogates. To
the extent that these groups already have been assuaged or
otherwise could not stop the legislative bargain, they should not
present a barrier to enactment of corrective legislation. And there
probably is some truth to the conjecture that textualist interpretations that deviate from the legislature’s understanding of statutory
bargains can be corrected more easily than intentionalist misinterpretation, as evidenced by the fact that Congress seems more apt to
overrule textualist interpretations than purposivist ones.136 But one
cannot conclude from this differential in ease of correction that the
cost of textualist misinterpretations is insignificant. In particular,
those who control vetogates, having once obtained their due from
the legislative process in exchange for allowing the statute to pass,
are not above extracting more concessions now that the court has
destroyed that deal and Congress has to enact clarifying legislation
to reinstate the original bargain.
Of course, just as the legislature cannot feasibly use a judicial
process for ascribing meaning to statutes they enact, courts cannot
establish some vetting process similar to that used by the legislature to determine statutory meaning. Such a process would be
antithetical to the judicial sine qua non of reasoned decision mak-

135. See Eskridge, supra note 47, at 1459 (noting that vetogates discourage congressional
override of a judicial interpretation via “omnibus legislation” or “large-scale statutory
revision”); supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
136. According to Bill Eskridge, “Congress is much more likely to override ‘plain meaning’
decisions than any other type of Supreme Court statutory decision” and “rarely appears to
override those interpretations grounded on statutory ‘purpose.’” William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 348 (1991).
This might reflect that purposivist errors are more likely than textualist errors to manifest
themselves as failures to recognize legislative bargains that reflect special interest group and
vetogate accommodations. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 239-40
(1986) (discussing the different effects of erroneous interpretation that seeks to further public
purposes rather than to enforce special interest bargains). Because such groups usually can
stop legislation they dislike, but not force enactment of their legislative preferences, they are
unlikely to be able to force an override of a judicial interpretation to recapture the bargain
they obtained by threatening to prevent legislation in the first place.
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ing.137 Nor can one expect courts to determine a “factually verifiable
assessment[ ] of the legislative process” for every provision they
have to interpret, as that would be cost prohibitive.138 In contrast,
however, pragmatically a court will have little problem accommodating the legislative means of ascribing meaning by adding legislative
history to the set of factors they consider when interpreting
statutes. Although use of legislative history adds to the effort judges
must make to interpret statutes,139 judges already know how to find
relevant legislative history. In fact, use of legislative history was the
predominant mode of interpretation by American courts for many
decades.140 The cost of judicial consideration of legislative history,
rather than being simple procedural costs, will predominantly be
error costs from improperly attributing legislative meaning to a
provision based on legislative history that does not reflect the
understanding of a majority of legislators or of the median legislator. This cost must be balanced against the pragmatic costs of the
legislative process engaging in a probability updating analysis.
Certainly courts can improve in selecting the pieces of legislative
history on which to rely. But recent studies of the legislative
process141 will help in that endeavor, as will the limitation of use of
legislative history to cases of legislative process failure. On the
137. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365-66
(1978) (arguing that “reasoned argument” is the essence of “forensic proceedings”); David L.
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (“A requirement
that judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds of decision that can be debated,
attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of
power.”).
138. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 616.
139. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 192-96 (2006) (arguing that the cost of using legislative history is
significant and outweighs the likely benefit of such use, and further contending that rules that
allow some consideration to limit judicial decision costs are “highly unstable” and likely to
devolve into unlimited consideration of legislative history); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy
and Heterogeneity: How to Read Statutes in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 473-76
(arguing that because of heavier caseloads and less impact on the law, lower courts should
avoid time consuming consideration of legislative history). But see Jonathan R. Siegel,
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 MINN. L. REV. 387, 406-07 (2007)
(questioning Vermeule’s contentions about the cost of using legislative history).
140. See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 132, at 127-28 (noting that use of legislative
history was disfavored in the United States until about 1860, sporadic from about 1860 until
1940, and prevalent from 1940 until the textualist critique led to a noticeable reduction in the
use of legislative history quite recently).
141. E.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27; Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105.
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whole, this balance clearly favors having the courts accommodate
the non-linear legislative process when the legislature is unaware
that the courts would likely interpret the language differently than
legislators understood it.
The balance changes, however, for statutory provisions about
which legislators had a clear signal that the text might not accurately reflect the legislative understanding of the statute. First,
when there is a signal that specific language of the statute might be
problematic, the cost of legislative correction is, at most, comparable
to that of the judiciary. Attorneys in the Office of Legislative Counsel can subject the problematic provision to the same analysis that
courts perform to determine meaning, identify what might create
the unintended meaning, and add language to clarify the meaning.
Often, Congress need not even engage in a detailed textual analysis,
given that the legislative process has already identified the
ambiguous or potentially misleading nature of the text. Armed with
this identification, all Congress needs to do is add clarifying
language—the kind of language that currently might get inserted
in legislative history. Drafting clear language, although not a trivial
task, becomes easier once one identifies the precise bargain being
struck and focuses on the particular provision meant to incorporate
that bargain.
Second, the error costs of using legislative history are likely to be
greater when Congress is aware that the understanding of a
statutory provision expressed in the legislative history is likely
different from the best objective reading of the provision’s text. If
the legislature is aware of the potential difference—in essence, of
the seeming legislative process failure—and does nothing to correct
it, that failure to act suggests that a correction could not get through
the legislative process.142 But in that case, a court should suspect
that the legislative history fails to reflect the legislative bargain
that Congress has struck. In essence, the difference between
142. The inclusion in legislative history rather than statutory text might also reflect a
desire to simplify the process of obtaining the desired legislative bargain. But given that the
constitutionally specified process for enacting statutes was meant to make enactment
difficult, one might view the time constraints of the process as an integral part of the barriers
Congress must overcome. See John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 GREEN BAG 2D
191, 198-99 (2007) (“Even the quickest look at the constitutional structure reveals that the
design of bicameralism and presentment disfavors easygoing, high volume lawmaking.”).

508

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:467

legislative history and statutory text does not then reflect legislative
process failure. Rather, it more likely reflects that statutory text
accurately communicates the legislative bargain.
There is also the possibility that the text was crafted “very
broadly or very narrowly to elide disagreements over specific
applications.”143 In essence, the drafters may have chosen purposively to word a bill ambiguously to facilitate its enactment.144 In this
situation the ambiguity would be known, so again there is no
legislative process failure. The bargain is to make the statute
ambiguous, thereby assigning to the courts or to the implementing
agencies the task of resolving the ambiguity by the decoding
conventions generally used by these institutions.145
The analysis of the costs of accommodating the different methods
that legislators and courts use to attribute meaning to statutes
suggests that courts should be willing to consider legislative history
when faced with a true legislative process failure. In order to
constitute legislative process failure, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the understanding expressed in legislative history differs
from the best reading of the language of a statute. In addition,
courts should not rely on legislative history if there are indications
that participants in the enactment process recognized that courts
might reasonably interpret the statute differently. Furthermore,
courts should limit consideration to reliable legislative history, by
which I mean legislative history that is either generally accepted by
participants in the legislative process as an indication of their

143. Manning, supra note 41, at 2409.
144. Leaving statutory text ambiguous appears to be a prevalent practice to grease the
skids of bill passage. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 105, at 576, 596 (reporting that
Senate Judiciary Committee staff members unanimously saw deliberate ambiguity as a
“powerful force working against statutory clarity”).
145. Because the legislative bargain does not resolve the ambiguity, it would be
inappropriate for a court to use legislative history to resolve the ambiguity under an intentbased approach. But see infra note 189 (collecting sources that argue that intentional
ambiguity might be a delegation to courts to make policy or use legislative history to interpret
the statute). It might, thus, be appropriate for an agency to rely on legislative history. See
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 525 n.5 (2009) (“The intent of the full
Congress (or at least a majority of each House) is thought relevant to the interpretation of
statutes, since they must be passed by the entire Congress.... It is quite irrelevant, however,
to the extrastatutory influence Congress exerts over agencies of the Executive Branch, which
is exerted by the congressional committees responsible for oversight and appropriations with
respect to the relevant agency.” (citation omitted)).
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understanding of the statute, or that the court has reason to believe
reflects participants’ understanding for the particular statutory
provision being interpreted.146
Those parts of the legislative history to which legislative staff pay
special attention are especially reliable indicators of the legislative
understanding of statutory meaning. Particularly useful are reports
of committees responsible for drafting and introducing the legislation,147 and of conference committees, which scholars and some
discerning judges already recognize to be reliable indicators of the
legislature’s understanding of a bill.148 Interestingly, legislative staff
members ascribe special credence to colloquies between committee
chairs and the ranking minority member of the committee or other
legislators involved with the bill, even if those colloquies are
staged.149 This is legislative history that courts usually dismiss as
unreliable.150 But legislative staff members report that such colloquies signal agreement by both sides, or a compromise to solve a
problem with the legislation.151 As such, the colloquies may be good
evidence of the median legislator’s understanding, and hence a
reliable indicator of legislative intent.152
One might object that even within the limits just described,
consideration of legislative history may encourage strategic behavior to insert explanations of statutes in legislative history that
could not be approved by both houses of Congress or signed by the
President.153 But such strategic manipulation of legislative history
146. See Nourse, supra note 126, at 90-134 (delineating five principles that distinguish
reliable from unreliable legislative history based on the rules of the House and Senate and
norms of legislative practice).
147. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 977 (“By far, the types of legislative history
viewed as most reliable [by congressional staff members] were committee reports and
conference reports in support of the statute.”). Staffers also reported committee mark-ups as
reliable legislative history. Id. at 986.
148. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 126, at 92-104; id. at 98 n.110 (citing cases).
149. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 986.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (explaining how the position of the
median voter may be deemed legislative intent); cf. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 129,
at 1437-39 (advocating that courts look to agreements necessary to get pivotal legislators to
vote for the legislation).
153. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Against Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 711, 73031 (2005) (“An Intentionalist might also agree with Justice Scalia that the practice of
consulting legislative history encourages the strategic, surreptitious shaping of the legislative
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would be difficult under the legislative process failure theory of
interpretation because the explanation would have to be done in a
manner that does not signal a potential problem with the language
of the statute. Part III will show how legislative history can shed
light on the likely shared meaning of a statute without necessarily
alerting participants in the process that the statutory text is
problematic. This can occur when some potential understanding of
a statutory provision is simply overlooked. But planting a statement
that instructs courts about the meaning of a provision should
prompt a court to find that those involved in drafting the statute
were aware of the potential problem with the statutory language.
And this would undermine any finding of a process failure.154
Simultaneously, by raising awareness of a provision, the statement
will increase the likelihood that some person involved in drafting
will insert a counter-statement contesting the meaning conveyed by
the original statement. This action will further flag that the text is
ambiguous or otherwise problematic, again resulting in courts
discounting the value of legislative history under the legislative
process failure approach.155
III. EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE
A. The Absurdity Doctrine
Under the absurdity doctrine, courts will not read statutes in a
manner that leads to an absurd outcome in any particular factual
situation, even if the text of the statute is clear.156 Instead, the
record to favor a particular gloss on the statute.”); Schacter, supra note 119, at 642-43
(arguing that Scalia’s campaign against use of legislative history aims to discipline Congress
to avoid “egregious legislative misbehavior”).
154. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing why recognition of a problem
with the text by those involved in drafting may signal that the problem does not reflect
legislative process failure).
155. This will especially be true of the reliable pieces of legislative history, such as
committee-produced legislative history, to which there will be ample opportunity for those
who disagree to reply. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 978 (noting that there are
opportunities for those who support a bill but disagree with a committee report’s
characterization of the bill to respond to the report).
156. As Scalia stated: “[When] confronted ... with a statute which, if interpreted literally,
produces an absurd ... result ... [the Court’s] task is to give some alternative meaning to the
[statutory text] that avoids this consequence.” Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
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courts essentially rewrite the statute. Usually courts read the
statute as not applicable to the circumstances that give rise to the
absurd outcome.157 Sometimes, however, they substitute different
provisions that reflect the narrowest deviation from the text to avoid
the absurd result.158 The principle behind the absurdity doctrine is
that no reasonable person would favor an absurd result, hence it
cannot represent a legislative bargain.159 Thus, the implicit assumption underlying the application of the doctrine is that the legislature
did not mean to apply the statute in its literal sense to the situation
facing the court. Essentially, the court infers from the absurdity of
the outcome that the legislature could not have foreseen the
circumstances that led to the result because if it had, it would have
changed the statute to avoid the absurd result.
The absurdity doctrine is an application of a legislative process
failure model in which the outcome under the statute signals the
likely disparity between the legislature’s understanding and the
textualist derived meaning. The outcome provides the evidence that
Congress could not have, and therefore did not understand the
statute to operate as the text indicates it should in the particular
context. Moreover, because the absurd result reflects a legislative
oversight, tautologically, the legislature could not have been aware
of the need to change the statutory text.
What is particularly interesting about the absurdity doctrine is
textualists’ willingness to use it, at least in some circumstances. Of
course, in the narrowest sense, the absurdity doctrine does not
violate the textualist tenet to avoid using legislative history to
504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892) (“If a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act
must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.”).
157. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (interpreting a statute that provided
for inheritance by the testator’s last valid will not to allow the testator’s grandson to inherit
after the grandson was convicted of killing the testator).
158. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 65-66, 69-73 (1994)
(reading “knowingly” in the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act to apply
to the element of age to avoid absurd results, even though under a grammatical reading,
“knowingly” would only modify “distribution”); cf. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d
1060, 1068, 1070-71 (1998) (rejecting the Agency’s nonliteral interpretation of the statute,
even though a literal interpretion would have produced absurd results, because the Agency
“may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional intent”).
159. See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 84, at 2419-21 (discussing the
tension between textualism and the intent-based premises of the absurdity doctrine).
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choose the meaning of a statute.160 Nonetheless, the doctrine does
depend on extrinsic reference. In particular, the doctrine relies on
whether an interpretation reaches a result consistent with resolving
the problem at which the legislature took aim, rather than an
arbitrary outcome. Textualists might respond that absurdity is
measured against prevailing social norms, and hence social context
eliminates an absurd result from the most likely public meaning of
the statute.161 That is, any generally knowledgeable reader at the
time of enactment would reject a literal interpretation of the
statute. Nonetheless, textualist application of the doctrine creates
tension because such application depends on the judge substituting
her perceptions of social norms for those that underlie the outcome
dictated by literal application.162 Furthermore, invoking legislative
intent often will mitigate this tension either by confirming or
contradicting the judge’s perception.
To illustrate this tension, consider Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., a case in which the majority used legislative history
to interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the clear
meaning of the words, and in which Justice Scalia concurred relying
on the absurdity doctrine.163 The issue in Bock Laundry was the
admissibility of evidence that a witness had been convicted of a
felony in order to impeach the witness’s credibility.164 The relevant
statutory provision, Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
provided:
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1)
was ... [a felony], and the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect

160. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161. See Manning, supra note 41, at 2459 (“Because absurdity arises from the problem of
statutory generality, judges will face many fewer occasions for even considering absurdity if
they focus on the way people use language in context.”).
162. One need only remember the textualists’ favorite “whipping boy,” Holy Trinity Church
v. United States, a case in which the Court rejected the plain meaning of the statute as
absurd. See 143 U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892).
163. 490 U.S. 504 (1981).
164. Id. at 505.
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to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.165

From the time the Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference
of the United States proposed the addition of this rule until its
enactment, the rule went through several iterations in each house
of Congress. Prior to going to conference, the House version provided
for exclusion of all impeachment evidence of prior convictions except
for evidence of a crime involving dishonesty or false statements.166
The version reported out to the full chamber by the Senate Judiciary
Committee would have allowed impeachment evidence of criminal
defendants only for crimes involving dishonesty.167 “[F]or other
witnesses, it would have permitted prior felony evidence only if the
trial judge found that probative value outweighed ‘prejudicial effect
against the party offering that witness.’”168 The full Senate, however, amended its version of the bill to allow impeachment evidence
of crimes of dishonesty and felonies for all witnesses.169 The rule as
finally enacted allowed admission for crimes of dishonesty, but allowed admission of felony evidence only if the court determines that
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant.170 The addition, in conference, of the requirement
of prejudice to the defendant raised a question about whether the
rule’s “only if ” clause applied to civil as well as criminal defendants.
The Conference Committee Report was silent about the scope of
the defendants’ prejudice,171 but several members of the Conference
Committee justified the provision by appealing to the special
concerns of prejudice to the defendants in criminal prosecutions.
The Court read these members’ statements as sufficient to show
congressional understanding that the exception to universal admis-

165. Id. at 509 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609(a)).
166. Id. at 517-18.
167. Id. at 519.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 515-19.
170. Id. at 519-20.
171. The Committee Report stated that in criminal cases a defendant could introduce
impeachment evidence of a prosecution witness and the prosecution could not introduce
evidence of a prior felony of a defense witness. See id. at 520. But the Report did not state
whether that same asymmetry was meant to apply in civil cases. Id. at 520-21.
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sibility applied only for the benefit of criminal defendants.172 The
use of these statements alone is a thin reed on which to hang the
majority’s interpretation. The committee members’ statements
suggest that these members understood the exception to apply only
in criminal cases, and that the failure to limit the exception to
benefit criminal defendants was a simple oversight. But several of
the members of the Conference Committee who made the statements were those who earlier had opined that the rule applied in
both civil and criminal contexts. Hence they should have realized
the need to limit the applicability of the exception to protect
criminal defendants only. Furthermore, the Senate Judiciary
Committee introduced a version of the bill explicitly protecting only
criminal defendants, and the Senate as a whole rejected this
version, which suggests that some on the Conference Committee
were well aware that the language could be read to cover civil
defendants as well. Nonetheless, what makes the majority’s reading
plausible is that giving a preference to defendants but not plaintiffs
in civil cases seems inconsistent with the American legal tradition
of an equal playing field between plaintiff and defendant in such
cases.173
Justice Scalia, the quintessential textualist, avoided reliance on
legislative history, and reasoned that a limitation on admissibility
to benefit civil defendants was an absurd result.174 Thus, his reading
agreed with the majority’s, albeit based simply on avoiding this
result rather than on crediting legislative history. But this is a weak
case for invocation of the absurdity doctrine in its pure form. Even
in civil cases, there is a difference between the plaintiff, who invokes
the power of the courts, and the defendant, who must submit to that
power.175 One could oppose a plaintiff’s introduction of a civil defendant’s prior felony conviction on the ground that, having invoked the
power of the court, plaintiff’s introduction abuses the court’s
172. Id. at 521 n.26.
173. As the majority noted, “Denomination as a civil defendant or plaintiff, moreover, is
often happenstance based on which party filed first or on the nature of the suit.” Id. at 510.
174. Id. at 528-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
175. Although this distinction has not been used in construction of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, it influences other legal doctrines such as those relating to burden of proof on
jurisdictional issues. See generally Jeffrey L. Roether, Note, Interpreting Congressional
Silence: CAFA’s Jurisdictional Burden of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2749-50 (2007).
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authority in an effort to coerce a favorable settlement. Such a
position might be unusual, but it is not entirely absurd. Moreover,
suppose that the Conference Committee Report included this as a
reason to apply the exception to automatic admission of a felony
conviction on behalf of civil defendants. Although Scalia would
never explicitly rely on such a report, in the face of the report he
could not plausibly maintain the position that applying the exception in civil cases is absurd.
Ultimately, although I believe that neither absurdity nor use of
legislative history alone would justify the outcome in Bock Laundry,
the legislative process failure approach to interpretation might
support the outcome of the majority and Scalia. The unlikelihood of
the outcome a literal reading would generate, together with the
story of how the text came to read as it did, supports that the
omission of the adjective “criminal” before the term “defendant” was
an oversight. And such an oversight would explain why Congress
did not clarify the statutory language to support the consensus
understanding of the statute.
B. Scrivener’s Error
A variant on absurd outcomes is the doctrine of scrivener’s
error.176 Sometimes the language of a statute, although not leading
to an absurd result that the legal system cannot legally tolerate,
leads to a perverse result given the norms of society or the problem
that the statute aims to cure. Furthermore, that result is explainable as a minor error in syntax or punctuation that might not have
caught the attention of those considering the text of the statute
when it was enacted. That is, there seems to be little or no reason
for the statute to mean what it says literally in light of how the
world operates, when a small and easily overlooked change in the
text would lead to a meaning that avoids the tension with everyday
behavior, or even is explainable in terms of such behavior. In such
situations, a court could readily conclude that Congress almost
certainly did not mean to enact the language as passed, but rather
to enact the statute that incorporated the change. Legislative
176. Textualists are willing to correct scriveners’ errors when the error is apparent from
the text of the statute and norms of society. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 356.
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history can be useful in identifying such errors, although supportive
history would not be necessary under the legislative process failure
approach to statutory interpretation.
Perhaps the most illuminating case of this type of legislative
process failure is United States v. Locke.177 That case involved the
extinguishment of mining claims on federal land because the
claimants had failed to comply with a statutory requirement that
they file a notice of intention to hold the claim with state officials
and with the Bureau of Land Management.178 The statute required
the claimants to file their notice prior to December 31 of every year
after registering their claim.179 Claimants, however, filed their
notice on December 31.180 The Court held that the statute was clear,
and that “prior to December 31” did not mean on or prior to that
date.181 The Court reasoned that any day for filing is essentially as
good as any other.182 If the statute had said prior to September 18,
for instance, few would assume that the notice could be filed on that
date. Moreover, the claimant would always have at least one year
from the previous year’s notice to file the notice for the following
year.
The problem with the Court’s argument is that it ignores the fact
that December 31 is a special date on our calendars, being the last
day of the calendar year. If one were to ask the man on the street by
when an annual task had to be completed, he is likely to respond on
or before December 31.183 The Court’s literal reading of the statute,
however, is truly a trap for the unwary who, because of the significance of December 31, would be apt to read the statute carelessly to

177. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
178. Id. at 89-90.
179. Id. at 89.
180. Id. at 89-90.
181. Id. at 93.
182. Id. at 93-94.
183. To borrow from game theory, choosing any day of the year for renewal is a Nash
equilibrium, but allowing renewal on or before December 31 is by far the most salient one.
Had the statute said simply that a claim holder had to renew its claim every year, allowing
renewal on or before December 31 would be the most common understanding. See THOMAS
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55-57 (1960) (introducing the focal point concept to
game theory, and illustrating it by noting that students who were told they had to meet
someone the next day in New York City but not told when or where most commonly chose the
clock at Grand Central Station at noon).
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mean on or before the end of the calendar year.184 I can think of no
good reason why the state should prefer filing on or before December 30,185 and in my opinion the best understanding of how the
statutory language came to be is that Congress, like the unwary, did
not read its own language carefully and hence did not realize it was
setting this trap.
Of course, all approaches to statutory interpretation involve
judgment, and others can disagree with me about the lack of reason
for the “prior to” language. Given the need for judgment, as for cases
involving the absurdity doctrine, legislative history could have been
helpful in this case. On the one hand, consistent legislative discussion referring to the desire to have the filing done before the end of
the year would support the conclusion that requiring filing before
December 31 was not what Congress thought the statute required.
On the other hand, virtually any mention of a reason for requiring
the filing on or before December 30 would have sufficiently alerted
those drafting the statute about the textual error if they really
wanted the statute to require filing on or before December 31.
C. Hidden Statutory Ambiguity
Ambiguous statutory language is the most common reason courts
give for invoking legislative history.186 In doing so, they are engaging in partial legislative process failure analysis. If the language of
the statute is ambiguous, and the legislature presumably did not go
184. The Court’s ultimate interpretation may have been less harsh on the unwary than my
analysis suggests because, as the Court recognized, the potential for confusion in the actual
case seems to have been alleviated by the fact that regulations required filing “on or before
December 30.” Locke, 471 U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Bureau of Land Management regulations, 43
C.F.R. § 3833.2-1(b)(1) (1984)). But even the clarity of the regulations did not prevent the
Bureau of Land Management itself from mistakenly indicating in its 1978 questions and
answers pamphlet that the notice had to be filed on or before December 31 of each year. Id.
at 89-90 n.7.
185. In my discussions of Locke, the best possible reason I heard for writing the text as
enacted was given by my colleague Rob Atkinson, who suggested that perhaps Congress did
not want to make BLM workers stay in their offices until 5:00 PM on New Year’s Eve. But,
Bureau of Land Management regulations allowed notices to be filed by mail as long as they
were postmarked on or before December 30 and received in the office by January 19 of the
following year. See Zeppos, supra note 51, at 1315. The ability to file by mail undermines even
Atkinson’s far-fetched suggestion.
186. See Breyer, supra note 2, at 848 (“Using legislative history to help interpret unclear
statutory language seems natural.”); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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through a comprehensive interpretative exercise, then there is
reason to doubt the interpretation that results from such an
exercise. Courts reason that legislative history better indicates
Congress’s understanding of the language than some nonobvious
resolution of ambiguous text.187
The assumption, however, that all ambiguity warrants looking at
legislative history is problematic for two reasons. Recall that the
legislative process involves vetting language with lobbyists representing interest groups—construed broadly to include agencies and
the White House as well as public and special interest group
representatives—committee staff, and members of individual
legislators’ staffs who have an interest in the legislation.188 Even
though Congress does not go through a formal probability updating
process of interpretation, the fact that such a process reflects how
we all generally use language means that vetting is likely to resolve
unintended ambiguities. Thus, the fact that the ambiguity was not
resolved most likely reflected an inability of the legislature to agree
on clear language, in essence leaving the statute intentionally
ambiguous. In such a situation, the legislative bargain ultimately
punts the question of what the statute means to the courts or an
agency, understanding that they will resolve the question using the
techniques of interpretation appropriate to those institutions.189
Second, reliance on legislative history in the face of any ambiguity
ignores the potential for manipulation by those who can influence
legislative history more easily than text—perhaps outlier committee
members or even congressional staff members.190 If the ambiguity
187. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 456 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); United States v. Donruss Co., 393
U.S. 297, 302-03 (1969).
188. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
189. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 27, at 991 (reporting that staffers are aware of
Chevron and understand that leaving issues textually unresolved delegates the interpretation
to an agency, but reporting that such delegation often is not the reason for the ambiguity).
That still leaves open the question of what constitutes appropriate techniques. See Elhauge,
supra note 41, at 2173-74 (2002) (noting that intentional ambiguity might signal intent for
courts to resolve an issue by making a policy choice or by applying interpretive default rules);
Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1087-88 (2010) (intimating that
intentional ambiguity can be seen as a delegation to the courts to use traditional inquiries
into legislative intent to resolve the ambiguity); Manning, supra note 7, at 84-85 (arguing that
textualists are willing to consider the purpose of a statute to resolve ambiguity, but will not
use legislative history to determine that purpose).
190. See supra notes 40, 74-75 and accompanying text.
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is known to those who are drafting language to incorporate a
particular meaning into the statute, then one would expect they
would clarify the language. They may fail to clarify it out of laziness
or lack of time.191 But once the ambiguity is known, the legislature
would not have to perform a comprehensive interpretive analysis.
It would simply need to replace the ambiguous language with text
that clearly communicates the legislative understanding. The cost
of changing the text to incorporate the intended meaning, therefore,
is relatively cheap if in fact that meaning can clear the legislative
process.192 Hence, the textualist argument that Congress should
clarify known ambiguities seems reasonable.
If, however, the ambiguity is hidden—that is, those within the
legislative process appear unaware of an ambiguity that would be
revealed by the judicial interpretive process—then the cost calculation changes. The cost of clarifying ambiguity that has remained
hidden after legislative vetting is extremely great because the cost
of identifying the ambiguity would be prohibitive. To identify all
provisions that a court might read differently than the legislative
understanding would require performing a judicial-type analysis
on the entire statute, which would be prohibitively expensive.193
Thus, reliance on legislative history rather than text to signal
congressional understanding would be reasonable to resolve questions of hidden ambiguity. On the flip side, use of reliable legislative
history to clarify hidden ambiguity would not impose great costs on
the legislative process. Manipulating legislative history to suggest
a meaning different from what the legislature would enact would
require the manipulator to claim that the statutory text has a nonobvious meaning, without signaling that the text was ambiguous in
the first place, which is no easy task. Even if a legislator were so
canny as to assert such a meaning without explicitly acknowledging
that the statute was ambiguous, others in the legislative process
could easily defeat manipulation simply by noting in the legislative
191. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
192. Many barriers exist to making these changes, such as competing legislative priorities,
vetogates, filibusters, and a host of other procedural hurdles that inhere in bicameralism and
presentment. But the textualist point—that the Constitution intentionally makes the
legislative process difficult even for legislation that might be favored by a majority of
legislators in both houses—seems an apt response to why the burden should be on Congress
to amend statutory text to clarify known ambiguities. See Manning, supra note 31, at 708-09.
193. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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history their disagreement with the meaning given by the manipulator. That notation essentially would convert hidden ambiguity into
apparent ambiguity, triggering the burden to clarify the statute or
have the courts interpret it according to the probability-updating
method of determining best meaning. Thus, judicial consideration
of legislative history seems to impose the lowest combined enactment and error costs.
One might question whether legislative history can ever signal
the meaning of a statute when ambiguity in the statute is not
known to those involved in the enactment process. I agree that this
is highly improbable when the legislative history directly aims to
explain or clarify the meaning of a statutory provision. There are
situations, however, when legislative history can clarify the meaning of a term on which the history does not focus. In particular, in
explaining a legislative response to one question, the discussion in
the history might manifest a universal understanding of a term on
which the legislature is not focusing, but which later turns out to be
important and ambiguous.
An example of a yet to be resolved statutory ambiguity that illustrates the value of the legal process failure approach to clarify
hidden ambiguity involves whether section 189(a) of the Atomic
Energy Act mandates formal hearings under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) for issuance of, or renewal of, licenses for nuclear power plants.194 Recently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), the successor to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), has
advocated that section 189(a) allows it to issue power plant licenses
194. In 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) adopted a rule relaxing some of
the procedural requirements it had imposed on power plant licensing hearings under section
189(a). NRC Changes to Adjudicatory Process Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 2182 (Jan. 14, 2004)
(relevant part codified at 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.1200-2.1213 (2013)). The NRC explicitly relied on its
interpretation that section 189(a) did not trigger the formal hearing provisions in the APA.
Id. at 2183; see also id. at 2183-85 (detailing the history of how the NRC moved from
interpreting section 189(a) to requiring formal hearings to its current position). The First
Circuit declined to rule on the Agency position that section 189(a) did not trigger these
provisions, and instead affirmed the regulation as consistent with the requirements of
sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391
F.3d 338, 348 (1st Cir. 2004) (“For years, the courts of appeals have avoided the question of
whether section [189(a)] requires reactor licensing hearings to be on the record. We too decline
to resolve this issue.”) (citations omitted). Thus, even today—fifty-one years since relevant
parts of section 189(a) were last amended—whether that section mandates formal hearings
remains a potentially relevant undecided interpretive question. See 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (2012).
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without complying with the hearing requirements specified in
sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA.195
When enacted in 1954, the Atomic Energy Act provided that in
any licensing proceeding or rule-making proceeding involving activities of licensees, “the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the
request of any person whose interest may be affected by the
proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such
proceeding.”196 In 1957, reacting to concerns about safety of certain
types of nuclear facilities, including nuclear power plants, Congress
amended section 189(a) to require a hearing for licensing these
facilities.197
At the time, the prevailing view was that statutorily required
hearings in adjudications were presumptively governed by the
APA procedures specified in sections 554, 556, and 557, even without an explicit requirement that the agency decision be based on the
record created.198 In addition, the legislative history of the 1957
195. See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc., 391 F.3d at 344 (“In January of 1999, the NRC’s
general counsel drafted a legal memorandum concluding that the Atomic Energy Act did not
require reactor licensing hearings to be on the record.”). The First Circuit upheld the NRC
procedures as consistent with the APA requirements for formal procedures without deciding
whether they had to be formal. Id. at 348.
196. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, § 189(a), 68 Stat. 919, 956 (prior to 1957
amendment).
197. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 7, 71 Stat. 576, 579 (“The Commission shall
hold a hearing after thirty days notice and publication once in the Federal Register on each
application ... for a license for a [nuclear] facility, and on any application ... for a license for
a [nuclear] testing facility.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 42 (1947) (“It is believed that with respect to adjudication the specific
statutory requirement of a hearing, without anything more, carries with it the further
requirement of decision on the basis of the evidence adduced at the hearing.”). In addition, the
Supreme Court had recently decided that the APA formal hearing requirements apply when
the Due Process Clause requires a hearing even if the statute did not. See Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-51 (1950). That case is instructive because, although the Supreme
Court had previously held that due process required a hearing in deportation cases, there was
no mention in Wong Yang Sung of the triggering language that the hearing be “on the record,”
supporting the view that when either a statute or the Constitution requires a hearing in
adjudication, the hearing is to be formal. Id. at 52; see Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
907 (1951) (per curiam) (requiring formal proceedings for a certificate of public convenience
and necessity hearing before Interstate Commerce Commission). This presumption that
adjudicatory hearings were to be formal was eroded by Supreme Court decisions in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973);
United States v. Alleghany Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972). See William Funk, Jr.,
The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 888-90 (2006);
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amendment suggested that Congress meant for the hearings to be
formal.199 Not surprisingly, the general view, expressed consistently
by the AEC immediately after these amendments, was that the
statute required these hearings to be governed by the APA specified
procedures.200
Facilities subject to the mandatory hearing requirement, however, had to obtain a permit prior to construction and a separate
license after construction before commencing operation.201 Under the
APA, both agency actions are grants of licenses, which translated
into such facilities having to go through two trial type hearings.202
In 1960, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy asked the AEC to
respond to criticism that the licensing procedures were “unnecessarsee also Gary J. Edles, An APA-Default Presumption for Administrative Hearings: Some
Thoughts on “Ossifying” the Adjudication Process, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 791 (2003) (arguing
that the term hearing in a statute did not necessarily trigger APA formal procedures, but that
“the APA mandated uniform procedures only where, generally speaking, such hearings were
either required by explicit statutory ‘on-the-record’ language or courts or agencies had
assumed that ‘on-the-record’ hearings were required”); Cooley R. Howarth, Restoring the
Applicability of the APA’s Adjudicatory Procedures, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1043, 1047-48 (2004)
(arguing that in enacting the APA, Congress intended that an agency use the APA’s formal
procedures when a statute called for a hearing in an adjudication).
199. See Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety: Hearing Before the J. Comm. on
Atomic Energy, 85th Cong. 7 (1957) (statement of Sen. Clinton P. Anderson, Vice Chairman,
J. Comm. on Atomic Energy); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 85TH CONG., STUDY OF
AEC PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION IN THE LICENSING OF REACTOR FACILITIES 20 (Comm.
Print 1957). Senator Anderson had also expressed the need for mandatory formal hearings
during debate on the 1954 Act. See 100 CONG. REC. 10,485 (1954). The 1954 Act, however, only
required hearings on request of an interested person, whereas the 1957 Amendments
incorporated Senator Anderson’s preference for mandatory hearings for nuclear power
reactors. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
200. See Letter from Loren K. Olson, Comm’r, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, to James T.
Ramey, Exec. Dir., J. Comm. on Atomic Energy (Nov. 30, 1960), in STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
ATOMIC ENERGY, 87TH CONG., IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PROCESS 580 (1961); Letter
from Loren K. Olson, Comm’r, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm., to James T. Ramey, Exec. Dir., J.
Comm. on Atomic Energy (Dec. 22, 1960), in IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PROCESS,
supra, at 588; ATOMIC ENERGY COMM’N, THE REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION (Feb. 1961), in IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PROCESS, supra, at 409-10; see
also, Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc., 11 N.R.C 799, 809 & nn.7-8 (1980) (Bradford, Comm’r,
dissenting) (citing documents supporting the NRC’s consistent position that section 189(a)
requires formal procedures).
201. See Classification and Description of Licenses, 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.21-.24 (1957).
202. See generally AEC Regulatory Problems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the
J. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 87th Cong. 1-2, 28-29, 38 (1962); Letter from James T. Ramey,
Exec. Dir., J. Comm. on Atomic Energy, to Loren K. Olson, Comm’r, U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm. (Nov. 7, 1960), in IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PROCESS, supra note 200, at 57576 (questioning the duplicative nature of the licensing and hearing process).
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ily formal and judicialized.”203 Thus, in that year, Congress once
again considered amendments to section 189(a).
In its initial response to the Joint Committee’s request, NRC
Commissioner Olson stated the AEC position that the hearings
required by the 1957 amendments had to be formal.204 The Agency
contended that the procedures it used were justified because of the
importance of reactor safety issues and the lack of substantial
experience in reactor licensing, but indicated that “[i]t is possible
that substantially less full presentation of testimony would be appropriate in some cases” after the Agency gained more experience
with operation of power reactors.205 Consultants to the Joint Committee testified in 1961 that formal hearings served little purpose
in uncontested licensing proceedings. These consultants suggested
that Congress change the language of section 189(a) to allow the
Commission to use less formal procedures for licensing.206 The Joint
Committee rejected this change, recommending instead that the
Commission use “informal procedures to the maximum extent permitted by the Administrative Procedure Act.”207 The APA, however,
does not include any provision governing the adjudicatory process
outside of the formal procedures specified by sections 554, 556, and
557.208 But, these provisions do give agencies significant leeway to
limit or dispense with cross examination, and for initial licensing,
they further allow submission of all or part of the evidence in written form.209 Hence, the Joint Committee statement is best read to
203. Letter from James T. Ramey, Exec. Dir., J. Comm. on Atomic Energy, to Loren K.
Olson, Comm’r, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm. (Nov. 16, 1960), in IMPROVING THE AEC
REGULATORY PROCESS, supra note 200, at 587.
204. Letter from Loren K. Olson, Comm’r, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm., to James T. Ramey,
Exec. Dir., J. Comm. on Atomic Energy (Nov. 30, 1960), in IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATION
PROCESS, supra note 200, at 580.
205. THE REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, supra note 200, at
410.
206. See Memorandum from David F. Cavers & William Mitchell for J. Comm. on Atomic
Energy (April 17, 1962), in AEC Regulatory Problems, supra note 202, at 57.
207. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-1966, at 6 (1962).
208. The only potentially relevant provisions are those in § 555, entitled Ancillary Matters,
and these provide only limited rights, such as: the agency shall give prompt notice of the
denial of any written request, 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2012), and a party has the right to appear in
person in any agency proceeding, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). The manner in which the agency might
meet these requirements (that is any specific procedure that the agency must follow) is not
specified.
209. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (stating that the agency may provide for exclusion of unduly repeti-
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refer to the flexibility allowed by these APA sections. The only clear
mention that the hearings need not be on the record came in testimony during Joint Committee Hearings in 1961 from Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis, who disagreed with AEC Commissioner
Olson’s argument that the 1957 amendments required trial-type
hearings.210
The proposal before Congress from the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy in 1962 was not intended to change the nature of the
required hearings. Rather, the Committee bill eliminated the
requirement for hearings before the Commission issued operating
licenses (but not construction permits) unless a hearing was
requested by an interested person.211 Congress enacted this Joint
Committee bill.212 The assumption by virtually all who participated
in the process was that the hearings required for power plants had
to be formal, and the agency indicated that it would continue to read
the statute to impose that requirement. The debate did not center
on the issue of the formality of hearings, and there was no incentive
to members of Congress to salt the legislative history on that issue.
In essence, Congress focused on whether it was appropriate to eliminate the second hearing for licensing of nuclear power plants. But
the consistent assumption that the statutorily required hearings
tious evidence and must give opportunity for such cross examination as may be required for
a full and true disclosure of the facts); see Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States,
391 F.3d 338, 350-51 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that the NRC abbreviated reactor licensing
hearings complied with § 556 of the APA).
210. See Radiation Safety and Regulation: Hearings Before the J. Comm. on Atomic Energy,
87th Cong. 376, 386 (1961) (statement by Kenneth Culp Davis, Professor, Univ. of Minn.
School of Law).
211. S. REP. NO. 87-1677, at 7-8 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2207, 2214. The
Joint Committee proposed amending section 189(a) by inserting the following in lieu of the
second sentence:
The Commission shall hold a hearing after thirty days’ notice and publication
once in the Federal Register, on each application under section 103 or 104b. for
a [license] construction permit for a facility, and on any application under section
104c. for a [license] construction permit for a testing facility. In cases where such
a construction permit has been issued following the holding of such a hearing, the
Commission may, in the absence of a request therefor by any person whose interest may be affected, issue an operating license or an amendment to a construction
permit or an amendment to an operating license without a hearing, but upon thirty days’ notice and publication once in the Federal Register of its intent to do so.
Id. at 16-17, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2207 (proposing that the words in brackets be
deleted and the words in italics be added to the text).
212. Act of Aug. 29, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-615, sec. 191, § 2, 76 Stat. 409, 409.
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had to be formal is telling about what Congress understood the
statute to mean precisely because consideration of changing this
meaning was not on the table.
D. Hidden “Clear” Meaning
As oxymoronic as it sounds, statutes may contain hidden “clear”
meaning. When statutes are highly technical or complex, they can
contain meaning that becomes clear only after being subject to
interpretation by judicial-type probability updating. In such instances, clear meaning might not have been discovered by those involved
in enactment, and legislative history might reliably indicate that
those who enacted the statute had a different understanding.
Despite the meaning that results from judicial-type interpretation,
the legislature might well have been unaware of the need to change
the language of the statute to enact the legislation that it thought
it was passing.
The Court’s decision in Zuni Public School District v. Department
of Education can be read to illustrate this category of legislative
process failure.213 This case involved the Federal Impact Aid
Program (FIAP), which provides federal aid to local school districts
whose educational funding is adversely affected by a federal presence.214 The statute prohibits states from cutting funding to such
school districts in light of the federal aid they receive.215 But the
statute includes an exception to this prohibition on offsetting
reduction in state funding when the Secretary of Education
determines that the state program “equalizes expenditures” among
school districts.216 More specifically, the statute provides that a state
aid program equalizes expenditures if “the amount of per-pupil
expenditures made by [the local school district] with the highest
such per-pupil expenditures ... [does] not exceed the amount of perpupil expenditures made by [the local school district] with the
lowest such expenditures ... by more than 25 percent.”217 Further, in
comparing the expenditures of highest and lowest school districts,
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2006).
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(A) (2000)).
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the Secretary is required to “disregard [school districts] with perpupil expenditures ... above the 95th percentile or below the 5th
percentile of such expenditures [in the State].”218
The Secretary of Education adopted a regulation implementing
the FIAP equalized spending exception that specified in detail how
the Secretary compares per-pupil expenditures in the districts with
the highest and lowest expenditures.219 First, all the local school
districts in a state are listed in order of the per-pupil expenditures
in each district.220 The school districts at the top of the list that
contain five percent of the state’s student population and the school
districts at the bottom that contain 5 percent of the state’s student
population are essentially stricken from the list.221 The per-pupil
expenditures of the remaining top and bottom districts are then
compared to see if they fall within twenty-five percent of each
other.222
Two school districts in New Mexico challenged the application of
this regulation for funding in 2000, claiming that the statute
specified that the top and bottom five percent of districts should be
removed before expenditures are compared, not the districts at the
top and bottom with five percent of the state’s student population.223
The Court found the statute ambiguous with respect to this issue,
and affirmed the regulation by invoking the Chevron doctrine.224
Justice Scalia wrote a strong dissent arguing that the language of
the statute was clear, and that the majority had relied on legislative
history essentially to create ambiguity.225
The problem for the majority is that if one reads the language of
the statute using the judicial approach, without considering the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, it seems to require that
the Secretary disregard the top and bottom five percent of school
districts. First, the statute calls for a comparison of the top and
bottom school districts, not the students getting the most and least
public dollars. Hence, the provision to disregard districts at the high
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 86 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(I) (2000)).
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 86-87 (quoting 34 C.F.R. pt. 222, subpt. K, app., ¶ 1 (2006)).
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 108-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and low ends of per-pupil expenditures would seem to refer to the
top and bottom five percent of the list of districts.226 Second, because
the per-pupil expenditures are averages across each school district
and hence the same for each student in a district, the term “such
expenditures” applies most naturally to the expenditures for each
school district, not to the expenditures for the top and bottom five
percent of students.227
The majority attempted to side-step these problems by starting
its analysis with a description of how the statute came to be.228
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, explained that the Secretary had adopted the challenged regulation in 1976, when the
statute had left the definition of the term “equalizing expenditures”
to the Secretary’s discretion.229 The current version of the statute,
with the specified formula for determining whether a state aid
program equalizes expenditures, was sent to Congress as draft
legislation in 1994, and enacted without any change relevant to the
controversy before the court, and without any comment or clarification.230 After the statute was passed, the Secretary continued to
compare the districts with the highest and lowest spending as he
had done before enactment, as evidenced by the fact that he was
still using that approach in 2000.231 Thus, the best understanding
226. The majority argued that the statute did not specify the distribution from which the
top and bottom five percent of school districts were to be selected. But, in essence, the list for
which the statute called was a list of districts, not a list of students in the district ordered by
the per-pupil expenditures. See id. at 111-12. This undermines the majority’s finding of
linguistic ambiguity. Id. at 96-97 (majority opinion).
227. See id. at 113 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 89-90 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens, who joined the majority, also wrote
separately on the issue of whether clear language should necessarily control statutory interpretation:
This happens to be a case in which the legislative history is pellucidly clear
and the statutory text is difficult to fathom. Moreover, it is not a case in which
I can imagine anyone accusing any Member of the Court of voting one way or
another because of that Justice’s policy preferences.
Given the clarity of the evidence of Congress’ ‘intention on the precise
question at issue,’ I would [uphold the regulation] even I thought that the
petitioners’ literal reading of the statutory text was correct.
Id. at 106-07 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted). Justice Souter also
found the legislative intent clear, although he dissented on grounds that such intent cannot
overcome the clear meaning of the statute. See id. at 123 (Souter, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 90 (majority opinion).
230. Id. at 90-91.
231. Id. at 88-91.
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for the amendment was that it was an attempt to codify the
technical practice employed by the Secretary.
The story of how the statute came to be, however, cannot convert
what was a clear statute into one that is semantically ambiguous.
Hence for me, the majority’s opinion is a thinly veiled interpretation
of the statute at odds with the technical language Congress enacted.
Nonetheless, I find the majority’s reading of the statute to be
persuasive under my legislative process failure theory. The
language at issue is, by standards of usual statutes, fairly technical
and not the kind with which members of Congress or the staff
members typically grapple.232 If the Secretary indicated what he
understood the statute to mean, one lacking in statistical acumen
most likely would not realize that the language failed to incorporate
the Secretary’s existing practice. There is no indication that any
member of Congress, or anyone else involved in its enactment,
understood the statute to change the method by which the Secretary
implemented the FIAP. To the contrary, the fact that the Secretary
both submitted the language that was enacted and continued to
apply the previously adopted regulation is a strong indication that
he thought the language was consistent with that regulation. Nor
is this a situation in which legislators opined on the meaning of the
statute, let alone tried to game the system to fool a court into granting them what they could not get Congress to pass. Therefore,
despite the clarity of the language when considered closely using
judicial tools of interpretation, this evidence almost certainly
supports that legislators who voted on the bill understood it to
authorize the Secretary’s approach to implementing the statute. In
short, the legislative process failure approach to interpretation vindicates the holding in the case.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of various theories of statutory interpretation debate
the propriety of courts focusing on the subjective intent of the
legislature rather than the objective meaning of text. In doing so,
they fail to take sufficient account of the differences between how
courts interpreting statutes assign meaning to text, and how legis232. See id. at 90.

2014]

PROCESS FAILURE THEORY

529

latures enacting the text do so. Courts find meaning by engaging in
something akin to probability updating of the likely meaning of text,
whereas legislators use a process of vetting text among those with
an interest to identify any textual problems. Legislative history
plays a valuable role in the legislative process as a means of signaling the meaning of statutes to those involved in that process. For
this reason, with respect to determining statutory meaning, these
two institutions constitute different linguistic communities. The
differences in the mechanisms each uses to assign meaning enable
“legislative process failure,” which occurs when those mechanisms
lead to inconsistent understandings of statutory text.
The assumption of legislative supremacy requires that the courts
and the legislature come to some accommodation to ensure that
courts will interpret statutes in accord with the legislature’s understanding of statutory meaning. That assumption, however, does not
automatically translate into requiring courts to accommodate the
legislative mechanism for attaching meaning. Legislative supremacy is satisfied so long as Congress knows how courts will interpret
statutes and can ensure that the statutes it enacts will be interpreted as it intends. Legislative process failure theory therefore
leads to the question: Which branch should accommodate the other’s
method of attaching meaning to statutes, and under what circumstances?
Generally, legislatures cannot engage in judicial-type inquiries
into statutory meaning while drafting statutes because the cost of
engaging in such statutory analysis ex ante—that is, before identification of the potential provisions that might exhibit process
failure—is prohibitive. Therefore, legislative process failure generally warrants courts accommodating the legislative mechanism for
ascribing meaning to statutes by considering legislative intent,
which may counsel consideration of legislative history. But, once the
legislature is aware of a process failure, the cost of engaging in
judicial type textual inquiry becomes manageable, and the error
cost of interpretation due to strategic behavior, such as manipulation of legislative meaning by a subgroup of Congress, greatly
increases. Hence, in the face of such awareness, a textual approach
is justified.
Finally, this Article identified several signs that statutes reflect
legislative process failures—signs such as absurd interpretive
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outcomes, seeming slips of the pen, hidden ambiguity, and even
hidden “clear meaning”—and suggested how courts might structure
their interpretive inquiries in response to these failures.

